

CHAPITRE XII/CHAPTER XII
ÉNERGIE ATOMIQUE
ATOMIC ENERGY

PREMIÈRE PARTIE/PART I
MESURES DE SAUVEGARDE
SAFEGUARDS

861.

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*Le représentant auprès de l'Agence internationale de l'Énergie atomique
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Representative to International Atomic Energy Agency
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

LETTER NO. 47

Vienna, February 6, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference: My Telegram No. 18 of January 31.†

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

The discussion of this subject took up eight meetings in the current series of meetings of the Board of Governors. There was nothing in the discussion which suggested that the Soviet bloc or India had in any way modified their implacable opposition to the whole concept of safeguards. On the contrary, I have the feeling that, if the debate on this occasion was conducted in an even more bitter atmosphere than in the past, it was because the opponents of safeguards had been hoping that the new United States Administration would want to review their position and that, until they had had time to do so, the matter would not be pressed to a decision. Rightly or wrongly, the opponents of safeguards regard the principles and procedures which the Board has been engaged in formulating¹ as thoroughly ill-conceived and the Indian representative as much as said that they do not provide a good basis for that new start in the search for world peace for which the new President of the United States had called in his inaugural address.

2. Before the safeguards item was actually discussed in the Board, the Soviet delegation moved that it be deleted from the agenda for the present series of meetings. They and those who supported their motion argued that there was no need for haste, that any agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests would alter the whole context in which the safeguards document had been evolved, and that there would be no difficulty in handling requests for Agency assistance, to the extent that they involved safeguards, on the same *ad hoc* basis on which such requests had been handled in the past. More specifically, they held that the Secretariat had been at fault in not providing the Board with an analytical document on the basis of which the views expressed in the General Conference could be adequately taken into account. Indeed, the Soviet delegation seemed to be going further by suggesting that the Secretariat should itself have come forward with amendments to the safeguards document to reflect those views. There

¹ Voir Volume 27, le chapitre XV./See Volume 27, Chapter XV.