

4. Mr. Dulles said that perhaps there had been some lack of co-ordination in the State Department; and added that the Canadian draft resolution had in fact been seen by the United States delegation in New York some days before it was shown to him by Franco.

5. In conversation it developed that his reference to lack of consultation was principally to what he considered to be our failure to discuss the proposed draft in New York or here before it became known to other countries.

6. The Secretary then argued that by placing Outer Mongolia in the list of seventeen (later eighteen), we had made a concession to the Russians which he regarded as unnecessary and which destroyed the possibility of negotiation. The administration was now, he said, faced with a very serious political difficulty. He went so far as to say that he would expect in Congress an argument that Mr. Pearson had made a bargain with Mr. Molotov behind the backs of the United States. He indicated that it was impossible for the United States to consider Outer Mongolia. Moreover, this created a great difficulty with the Chinese Nationalist Government (Merchant added after we left the Secretary's room that the belief that the United States could influence the Nationalist Chinese vote in the Security Council was erroneous and that they would expect a veto by Nationalist China of Outer Mongolia).

7. No reference was made in the Secretary's remarks to the general problem of new members or to any alternative plan to what he referred to as the "Canadian resolution". His whole theme was that by lack of adequate consultation we had put the administration into an extremely difficult position. I was not invited to make any remarks on the substance of the matter. While expressing regret that there seemed to him to have been a lack of consultation, I confined myself to making several references to the consultations which had in fact taken place. I also recalled to him our original hope that some agreement could be reached between the four Great Powers.

8. Mr. Dulles made a plea for time, even if it amounted to only a few days. He asked that the introduction of the resolution in New York be put off as long as possible.

9. I telephoned this plea for time immediately to Mr. MacKay. Ends.

30.

DEA/5475-CR-40

*La délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Delegation to United Nations General Assembly  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 344

New York, November 23, 1955

SECRET. IMMEDIATE (FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY).

Reference: Washington Telegram to Ottawa No. 1941 of Nov. 23.

Repeat London No. 186; Paris No. 121; Washington No. 148.

#### NEW MEMBERS

Following From Martin: I am considerably disturbed to learn that it is Dulles' view that the Canadian Government had not adequately consulted the United States Government on our proposal for the admission of new members. There is no justification for that view nor for the suggestion that we have not been sufficiently co-operative with the United States in this matter. As you are aware and as Glazebrook pointed out to Dulles, our embassy in Wash-