1. That a large portion of the English common law, generally supposed to be indigenous, is of Roman origin, having either survived from the Roman occupation, or having been subsequently introduced through the influence of the Church, or under the early Norman kings.

2. That further additions were made to these Roman law elements in consequence of the revival of the study of civil law under Vacarius and his successors, and the incorporation by Bracton into his work of a considerable part of the *Corpus Juris*, either previously embodied in the common law or inserted by him as not being inconsistent with its provisions.

3. That many of the principles of the civil law were adopted through the medium of the Court of Chancery, the ecclesiastical courts, and the Court of Admiralty, where the civil law rules were either adopted or generally recognized as authorities.

4. That even in the common law courts, the extension of the law to meet the requirements of advancing civilization, and particularly the development of modern mercantile law, were largely on civil law lines, through the adoption of the *lex mercatoria*, and the favour with which eminent judges, such as Lord Holt and Lord Mansfield, regarded the Roman law.

5. That recent legislation, as, for instance, the extension of the rules of equity by the Judicature Act, has infused the equitable principles of the civil law into the law of England.

THE LAW OF DOWER.

SOME time ago we took occasion to express some doubt as to the correctness of the construction placed on the 42 Vict. c. 22 (O.), (now embodied in R. S. O. c. 133, s. 5, *et. seq.*) by the cases of *Smart* v. *Sorrenson*, 9 O. R. 640, and *Calvert* v. *Black*, 8 P. R. 255. These observations, which are to be found *ante* vol. 21, p. 405, have recently received additional force from the fact that in a recent case before the Chancellor, of *Re Croskery*, that learned judge has expressed a very strong opinion adverse to those cases. *Re Croskery* was an appeal from the Master in Chambers refusing an application by mortgagees to pay the surplus moneys into Court which remained in their hands, after satisfying their mortgage; the money in question having been derived from a sale of mortgaged property under a power of sale. Claims were made to the fund on the part both of the wife of the mortgagor, and his assignee for the benefit of creditors. If *Smart* v. *Sorrenson* were correct, the wife of the mortgagor could, of course, have no claim to the funds, her husband being still alive, and his equity of redemption having been extinguished, and the Master in Chambers so held, and therefore refused the application. But the Chancellor was of the opinion, after a careful examination of the authorities, without expressly overruling *Smart* v. *Sorrenson* and *Calvert* v. *Black* (which sitting in Chambers it was not competent for him to do), that the claim of the wife was of such a character that the mortgagees