

fore the Colonies alone have five times and we have ten times a greater stake in the sea than we had in the year succeeding Trafalgar. The navy estimates for 1805 were £14,493,848; in 1814 they were £22,000,000, or a little over one-fourth of the value of our exports and imports of that year. The value of exports and imports of Australian colonies alone is now equal to that of England and France together in 1802—the year of the peace of Amiens. Such facts as these sufficiently indicate that the burden of protection of our common commerce in war must be shared and justly distributed according to the capacity of the several joints in the Imperial back; they point unmistakably, first, to Federal naval positions, and next to a Federal fleet and a Federal movable army to support that fleet.

If the Empire has deliberately accepted the principle that each portion of it should be independently responsible for its territorial defence, no matter whether the population or internal resources of each are sufficient for the purpose or not; it has accepted a principle which renders it liable in war to subjugation in detail, unless the fallacy be assumed that the fleet of the United Kingdom can everywhere prevent any hostile attack exceeding in power means of isolated local defence. More than this, it risks the command of the sea, without which territorial defence in the United Kingdom means starvation, and in the Colonies ruin. I venture to think the Colonies have never been asked a question in the matter, and have simply accepted this principle of "domestic defence" because they were left no choice but to adopt it. They are loyal, and they are true, and though they must each and all, except Canada, acknowledge military weakness, they trust implicitly to one of two things—first, that war may not come till time has made them strong; second, that if it does come before they are ready, they trust to the statesmen of England to provide for every deficiency, and to cover every defect: they look to them, in short, to do "the rest." Now it is just these very deficiencies, it is just these very defects; it is, in short, "the rest" of Imperial defence that the statesmen of England cannot provide for without the spontaneous pressure of hearty, willing, and practical co-operation of the Colonies. They require watching and urging on, and they would not be human if they did not.

It is most important to remember that in 1854 we drifted into a war wholly unprepared. We declared war, and left "the rest" to the War Office and the Admiralty, and land transport, food, and clothing for our Crimean army was lost in the gulf which lies between the two departments. In that year the Secretary of State