

measures, such as the notification of military manoeuvres, designed to increase confidence between the two military alliances in Europe about each other's intentions. In the United Nations we participated in the recently concluded study on confidence-building measures. We have also supported efforts in the United Nations to limit the transfer of conventional weapons and to find ways of reducing military budgets. On both we are continuing to press for greater openness. I have approved moves to explore how Canada can publish more information on Canadian military sales to show more explicitly the Canadian record of a restrictive and sensitive policy in this area. Finally, Canada has vigorously supported the initiation of a UN study on conventional disarmament.

All of the subjects I have mentioned so far were considered at the first Special Session and will form part of the deliberations at UNSSOD II.

In preparing for UNSSOD II, it is appropriate to ask how Canada can best contribute towards the realization of arms control and disarmament agreements. Although agreements are not going to be negotiated at UNSSOD II, ways of promoting their realization will be a major preoccupation.

Importance of verification

From the earliest deliberations on disarmament after the Second World War, a consistent Canadian theme has been the importance of ensuring that terms of any agreement are being observed. Canada has also sought to encourage, where useful and possible, the involvement of the international community in witnessing compliance. That is what is meant by the term international verification. Concern about verification is even more important today with the growing complexity of weapons systems and the declining degree of international confidence. When compliance is called in question and verification provisions are inadequate, the whole process of arms control and disarmament becomes more difficult, not least as a result of the inevitable decline in confidence. I therefore become impatient with those who argue that concern for verification is little more than an obstructionist tactic or that taking an interest in verification is "playing the American game". The government is serious about arms control and disarmament as an instrument of security policy, and we will continue to emphasize the importance of verification, as the Prime Minister did at UNSSOD I, as the Speech from the Throne did two years ago and, I might add, as did the Final Document of UNSSOD I.

Canada's role

By stressing the practical aspects of verification and applying expertise in other areas to arms control and disarmament issues, Canada has been able to play a role in the past and can continue to make a contribution in the future. Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy makes us a world leader in this important aspect of promoting the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime, a priority of Canadian policy on arms control and disarmament.

Another example in which Canada has been involved for some years is the work on an
