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<sup>1</sup> National Missile Defense (NMD) refers to a ground-based anti-ballistic missile system designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats.

<sup>2</sup> The term weapons of mass destruction (WMD) commonly refers to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their related technologies. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation uses a broader definition, according to which a weapon crosses the WMD threshold when the consequences of its release overwhelm local responders.

<sup>3</sup> Dov S. Zackheim, "Old Rivalries, New Arsenals: Should the United States Worry?" *IEEE Spectrum*, Vol.36, March 1999, pp.30-31.

<sup>4</sup> Iraq fired al-Hussein Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although the attacks were militarily insignificant, they damaged approximately 4,000 buildings in Israel, caused severe disruption to normal life and psychological distress among the Israeli population, especially as there were fears that Iraq might be using chemical warheads. The attacks also had a disproportionate effect on allied strategy, as some 15% of its strategic air campaign had to be diverted to the task of destroying Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles. Had Israel not been defended by U.S. Patriot air-defense missiles and phased-array radars to plot incoming Scuds, Israeli retaliation against Iraq might well have changed the dynamics of the conflict profoundly by destroying the unity between the Western and Arab states. See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.307-311; 331-361. In the judgment of some, however, the Patriot's value was political rather than military. While its use helped to keep Israel out of the war, its success in intercepting Scud missiles was calculated by some studies to be no higher than 20%. See Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," *International Security*, Vol.16, No.3, 1991-92, pp.119-171.

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger quoted in Keith Payne, *Missile Defense in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Protection Against Limited Threats, Including Lessons from the Gulf War*, (Boulder: Westview, 1992), p.143.

<sup>6</sup> On this point see Keith Payne, "Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile Defense," *Orbis*, Vol.39, no.2, 1995, pp.201-224.

<sup>7</sup> Pat Towell, "Bush Wins on Missile Defense, But With Democratic Stipulation," *CQ Weekly*, June 29, 2002, p.1754.

<sup>8</sup> *Coming Into Range: Britain's Growing Vulnerability to Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, A Report by the Missile Proliferation Study Group, p.64. The report concluded that Britain's interests would be served by "U.K. support for and participation in an U.S.-led system of ballistic missile defence," the scope and capabilities of which "could be extended incrementally;" and warned that "continued reluctance to take the subject seriously" could only increase the vulnerability of British cities and armed forces. For the *Strategic Defence Review* see <http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/intro.htm>

<sup>9</sup> House of Commons Official Report. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Vol.367, No.79, Thursday 3 May, 2001, p.987. Douglas Barrie, "Hoon Divulges that U.K.'s View of WMD Defense Parallel's U.S.," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Vol.156, No.12, 2002, p.30.

<sup>10</sup> Theatre missile defence (TMD) refers to the strategies and tactics employed to defend a geographical area outside the United States against attack from short-range, intermediate-range, or medium-range missiles.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Krepon, "Moving Away From MAD," *Survival*, Vol.43, No.2, 2002, p.84.

<sup>12</sup> Edward M. Whalen, "The Military Aspects of European Security," in Carl C. Hodge Ed., *Redefining European Security*, (New York: Garland, 1999), p.258. See also Ian O. Lesser, *NATO Looks South: New Challenges and Strategies in the Mediterranean*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000).