

the effect of legitimizing human rights in the eyes of those UN sectors or individuals. In other words, military peace-keepers who have benefitted from human rights intelligence to do their traditional peace-keeping tasks, will be far more inclined to play a role in human rights monitoring and protection. UN negotiators who have achieved greater success through premising part of their actions on human rights intelligence, will become more aware of those human rights linkages and be more prepared to factor human rights into their political goals and procedures.

*Recommendation #48*

**It is recommended that all UN operation components, such as military peace-keepers, be more aware of how to use human rights intelligence and early warning to inform their tactical decisions and actions.**

### **7.3 Human Rights Protection**

It is a truism that the collection and analysis of human rights violations is useless unless something is done with it. Like any justice system, it is also almost as important that something must be seen to be done with it. Often the most problematic issue to be dealt with is the type and degree of protection action to be taken by an HRO and the larger UN field operation. At times local authorities are unwilling or unable to protect human rights, and might even be carrying out violations of human rights. Can the UN, or does the UN even want to, put in enough resources to fully protect human rights? As in ex-Yugoslavia or Somalia, the answer is often no, and the human rights operation and its partners must constantly make operational decisions in order to achieve what is possible with limited resources and political will.

An HRO has a restricted range of tools that can possibly protect human rights. Many of them are directed at, or work through others, who have greater legal, greater political, and certainly greater physical capacity to protect human rights, eg. local officials including local police, UN member states, senior UN staff, or UN military. HRO tools to influence others include HRO field reports and the public dissemination of early warning human rights intelligence, eg. press releases. MICIVIH, particularly as the situation in Haiti got worse, actively used strongly worded press releases to attempt to precipitate human rights protection. They were largely ignored, underscoring the fundamental importance of political will amongst UN members states, the UN bureaucracy, and the parties to the conflict.

That lack of political will of course is a recurring theme, and once again it must be emphasised that human rights must be fully integrated into the mainstream of UN political action. For example, reports of HROs should be a key resource, informing SRSGs in their dealings with the government. Those same reports should provide critical input into the deliberations of the SC, the GA, and other UN political forums. The High Commissioner for Human Rights will be a critical ally in the effort to integrate HROs into UN field operations and for HROs to influence UN political decision makers. Inter alia, the High Commissioner can lobby for HRO reports to be circulated and for HRO analysis to be incorporated into senior decision making within a UN operation, within the UN Secretariat, and within UN political forums.