

FADM and the addition of civilian police⁹⁴ to the mandate, although the latter had initially been rejected by the parties during the negotiation phase.

As with UNTAC and UNOSOM II, the long delay in the initial deployment of peacekeeping contingents meant that alleged cease-fire violations could not be effectively verified and demobilization could not begin. The delay, however, was not all occasioned by logistical and procedural problems in establishing a military and administrative presence as complex as that to be undertaken by ONUMOZ. The Government of Mozambique, in the words of the Secretary-General, "needed time to address concerns in the National Assembly about the implications for national sovereignty of such a large and comprehensive international operation." In addition, the negotiation of the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) between the United Nations and the government -- which would permit the movement of United Nations military personnel without prior government approval -- was not signed until 14 May, 1993.⁹⁵

RENAMO was reluctant during the peace process to accept government administration and authority over the areas that it physically controlled. It was equally reluctant to set up in the capital, Maputo, until it was provided with sufficient housing, transportation and communications facilities so that it could properly function, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, as a duly constituted political party.

Time was needed to train members of the rebel force to enable them to effectively participate in the various Commissions overseeing the peace implementation process. More broadly, RENAMO needed time and money for the transformation to a political party with a presence not only in Maputo but in the provincial capitals as well. This was a serious problem which severely impeded the proper functioning of the various Commissions and which was ultimately solved by a truly unique mechanism, a Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement⁹⁶, established by the UN and placed under the full control and authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General. This mechanism, with an initial contribution from Italy in May 1993 of almost \$6 million, provided a degree

⁹⁴ See paragraphs 156-159 of the UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, for the importance of the UNCIVPOL component.

⁹⁵ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, at p. 27, para. 91.

⁹⁶ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *op.cit.*, at pp. 31-32, para.104.