This was the immediate origin of the transformation view.

13.   *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89. In fact, the analysis initially identified nine distinct generic flaws (pp. 86-87) which it then reduced to two super categories as well as a more pervasive problem termed "analytic oversimplification" (pp. 91-93). The problem of oversimplification is worth further exploration but is not directly germane to the arguments developed in this review.

14.   See *ibid.*, pp. 94-110 in Chapter Seven. This discussion included a relatively detailed examination of *why* it was necessary to be sensitive to the full, complex nature of the Soviet military threat and why it was important to treat it seriously. It was argued in this chapter that there were several competing accounts of what type of threat the Soviet Union and the WTO actually posed, all roughly as well supported by the facts as we knew them at the time. Some of these alternative or competing "realities" were far more accommodating to the constructive adoption of CBM regimes than were others. Some, on the other hand, would make the pursuit of comprehensive confidence building a dangerous undertaking with little chance of positive results. Thus, paying explicit attention to the nature of the threat was important. And failing to address it explicitly was a serious problem and a puzzling oversight.

15.   The majority of Western analysts working in the confidence building area during this initial period - say, between 1970 and 1986 — were *not* inclined by training or perspective to simply dismiss as exaggerated or imagined the threat posed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization *before* they turned their attention to the confidence building idea. (The bibliography in *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process* lists these analysts, including Alford, Darilek, and Holst. The key writers are also identified in Chapter Five of the original study.) Many were distinctly concerned about the general state of security relations between the two blocs, about specific asymmetries and geographic flash-points, and about the potential threat represented by various technical developments in the Soviet military (and, to a lesser extent, offsetting or parallel developments in NATO). They were not ideologically predisposed to dismiss the possibility of conventional war nor to promote what might be

characterized as "dovish" security policies. Of particular relevance, many were concerned about the potential for "things getting out of hand," the potential for inadvertent war arising from misperception and over-reaction in a crisis. Although this argument needs to be developed further, it appears to be the case that shifts in attitude about the nature of security relations occurred at approximately the same time that these analysts were developing confidence building solutions and engaging in discussions promoting confidence building. Of roughly equal relevance, this shift in attitude clearly predated the dramatic changes in Soviet policy that made "believers" of former sceptics.

For those analysts from Poland, Hungary, and the other Central and East European states that comprised the non-Soviet part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it is less clear what transformation process occurred, if any, as part of their promotion of confidence building although it *is* clear that many were also quite enthusiastic about confidence building (and understood it in terms generally consistent with Western views). Many of them may have reached the conclusion that inadvertent war in Europe was the greatest single risk (with neither side being particularly more villainous nor ready to attack than the other) and that *any* coherent approach capable of reducing that risk was to be pursued as aggressively as possible. Because of their unique and slightly ambivalent position as citizens of states that were both ally and potential victim of the Soviet Union as well as residents in the midst of the potential battle ground in any major war, these analysts may have developed a moderated perspective favouring perception-altering CBMs that complemented rather than duplicated Western perspectives during the 1970s and 1980s. The confidence building approach, from their perspective, may have been the most politically acceptable *and* potentially successful security approach available for them to promote. This is an issue, however, that requires further exploration.

It is not clear to what extent Soviet analysts participating in the development and discussion of confidence building ideas shared Western conceptions. Many were fully conversant with the ideas developed by Western (NATO), neutral and non-aligned, and Central and East European writers although they were often reluctant to embrace them even in private discussions. It is likely that some of these Soviet analysts held private views roughly analogous to those of their Central and East European colleagues, seeing confidence building as