

7. The participants recalled that safeguard measures could only be invoked if there existed a situation of market disruption — as defined in Annex A — or real risk thereof. Noting that Article 6 envisages that in the application of such measures developing countries, especially new entrants, small suppliers and cotton producers shall be given more favourable terms than other countries, the Committee drew particular attention to paragraph 12 below.

8. With respect to the definition of market disruption contained in Annex A of the Arrangement, participants took due note that difficulties had arisen as to its application in practice, leading to misunderstandings between exporting and importing participants, which have had an adverse impact on the operation of the Arrangement. Consequently, and with a view to overcoming these difficulties, the participants agreed that the discipline of Annex A and the procedures of Articles 3 and 4 of the Arrangement should be fully respected and that requests for action under these Articles shall be accompanied by relevant specific factual information. The participants further agreed that the situation prevailing when such action was requested should be periodically reviewed by the parties concerned, the Textiles Surveillance Body (TSB) being promptly informed of any resulting modifications under the terms of Articles 3, paragraph 9, and/or 4, paragraph 4.

9. It was recalled that in exceptional cases where there is a recurrence or exacerbation of a situation of market disruption as referred to in Annex A, and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex B, a lower positive growth rate for a particular product from a particular source may be agreed upon between the parties to a bilateral agreement. It was further agreed that where such agreement has taken into account the growing impact of a heavily utilized quota with a very large restraint level for the product in question from a particular source, accounting for a very large share of the market of the importing country for textiles and clothing, the exporting party to the agreement concerned may agree to any mutually acceptable arrangements with regard to flexibility.

10. The view was expressed that real difficulties may be caused in importing countries by sharp and substantial increases in imports as a result of significant differences between larger restraint levels negotiated in accordance with Annex B on the one hand and actual imports on the other. Where such significant difficulties stem from consistently under-utilized larger restraint levels and cause or threaten serious and palpable damage to domestic industry, an exporting participant may agree to mutually satisfactory solutions or arrangements. Such solutions or arrangements shall provide for equitable and quantifiable compensation to the exporting participant to be agreed by both parties concerned.