

J141(I85)

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Proposal Abstract J141(I85)

1. **Arms Control Problem:**
Conventional weapons - ships
2. **Verification Type:**
 - (a) Remote sensors - satellite
 - aerial
 - shipboard
 - (b) On-site inspection - selective
3. **Source:**
United Nations. "Study on the Naval Arms Race: Report of the Secretary-General". A/40/535, 17 September 1985.
4. **Summary:**

This study examines the naval arms race in order to analyse its implications for international security, the freedom of the high seas, international shipping routes and the exploitation of marine resources. The fact that "a significant portion of the world's strategic nuclear capability is at sea" (p.88) places urgency on the need for negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The study lists possible measures for both quantitative and qualitative restraints and explores possible methods of verification and confidence-building measures.

The study notes that verification of naval disarmament has a number of features which distinguish it from verification of disarmament measures on land. First, verification at sea does not involve intrusion into or violation of land territory or territorial airspace if it is performed on the high seas and does not involve on-site inspection. Second, the specific physical limitations of naval vessels and naval aircraft permit the monitoring and identification of their presence and movements under certain circumstances. Third, verification is facilitated by the international nature and freedom of the high seas as long as the necessary physical and technical means are available. However, problems for verification are posed by submarines and the identification of which ships are, or may be, carrying nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the study notes that "measures to restrain technological improvements are generally very difficult to verify unless a particular technological element is altogether banned" (p.80).

Possible verification measures for naval disarmament include detection devices on satellites, aircraft or other vessels as well as devices could be deployed underwater. "Verification teams" could consist of representatives of (a) states participating in the measures, (b) international or regional organizations, or (c) neutral or other states from within, or outside, the area concerned. Confidence-building measures providing for openness and the transfer of information could enhance verification procedures.