

Our position is that the only kind of inspection which will be adequate to convince people that international control plans and policy are observed is that which gives far-reaching powers to the inspectors, while providing against the abuse of those powers. They, the inspectors, will be the agents of the international conscience and the international community, and no government which is sincere in this matter of international control of atomic energy, as we all are, would want to restrict or restrain them so that they could not discharge their duties efficiently.

Developing the same theme in his major review of external affairs in the House of Commons on November 16, 1949, Mr. Pearson said:

They (the Russians) talk loudly, especially at Lake Success, about immediate and unqualified outlawing of the atom bomb, but they refuse to participate in any scheme in which international control and inspection would be effective and adequate for that purpose. Without such control, pledges and protocol would, in the present atmosphere of international suspicion and mistrust, be worse than useless. They would be dangerous, by providing a false facade of security behind which the aggressor could develop his evil plans. We had some experience of this in the 1930's

The basic difficulty is of course, the Soviet fear of any contact with the west—a fear which is almost pathological. The Soviet leaders also stubbornly maintain that they cannot possibly accept any limitations of their sovereignty. We maintain, on the contrary, that we cannot afford to cling to an ancient concept of sovereignty when what we are seeking is a chance for survival. We shall never get anywhere, in our view, if we insist on talking about national sovereignty as if, in atomic matters, it were more important than national and international security, or if we consider that, by using our national sovereignty for joint action, we are losing it.

The mere restatement of the deadlock, however, was not satisfactory to any of the delegations at the General Assembly. While the impact of President Truman's announcement about the Soviet explosion was still fresh in their minds, the delegates were unwilling to admit defeat, and several suggestions for compromise were offered. As the Assembly turned to a discussion of atomic energy, General Romulo published an appeal to the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission pleading with them to accept some sort of stop-gap compromise agreement and offering four suggestions as to how such an agreement might possibly be reached. A resolution submitted by the Indian Representative called for the International Law Commission to prepare a draft declaration of the rights and duties of states and individuals insofar as atomic energy was concerned. A resolution submitted by the Argentine Delegate proposed "renunciation of the use of atomic weapons for purposes of aggression", and the Delegate of Haiti suggested that the Gordian knot be cut by a process of international legislation.

Although these suggestions were discussed in the Assembly and in Committee, the delegates did not think that they were competent to pass judgement on such matters until they had been more carefully examined, and supported instead a resolution* introduced by the Canadian and French Representatives calling upon "the permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to continue their consultations, to explore all possible avenues, and examine all concrete suggestions with a view to determining whether they might lead to an agreement securing the basic objectives of the General Assembly in this question", and recommending that "all nations, in the use of their rights of sovereignty, join in mutual agreement to limit the individual exercise of those rights in the control of atomic energy to the extent required". This Canadian-French

*For the text of the resolution, see Appendix 4, pp. 225-226.