pplause.)

Carberry at he had enjoyed since his arrival in especially had this one, he could see no in all the circumin a place which situated for the y situated for the hear, and applause.) case every isted for improve espects; and as time ed of the one-man it certainly gave n than the olde as further true that ing was accomplished (Applause.) It gave t pleasure and satis-ipon the grounds so nens of horses cattle, e. As a matter of here some of the that he had ever seen la. (Applause.) things and he believe

ner Responds odgson, the provincial missioner, said that very little, indeed, to Gray and Baron, he dvantage of this opthe very efficient they had given him difilling, to the best duties of his pres-plause.) He further atulate the director on their very excel exhibits of ep and swine. (Ap

n, very few fairs ticularly those which n in the very impor-s of horses and of cellence that the di-district had every eedingly proud of the ng which was made, is fair, moreover, was in years. Indeed, it infancy (hear, hear; nvinced, basing his everything which he n, there were to b

ill all meet here again eat applause.)

uncil just published the Saanich, Esquiand Islands electora electoral district the begin until October 15 ney, Delta and Chilli starts Oct. 15 and

TABLE

ant Season.

, September, 1908. meHt|Time Ht|Time Ht 19 57 6.9 23 19 7.1 4 6.9 11 18 6.6 16 40 8.0 s Pacific Standard, for

gures for height serve n feet and tenths of a erage level of the low-n each month of the is half a foot lower to which the soundings

chart of Victoria has rst solid leather fool

untain peak in the 29,000 feet high

structed by his Government to say that as the friendly proposal made by him on the previous day had been rejected no other course. of the Himalayas is than an appeal to arms remained open. He deeply regretted that the controversy should packets representing but of "Salada" Tea end to end, produce 000 feet in height, or er than the highest have been allowed to reach so unpleasant a climax, but the fault was not his: his orders were to quit London forthwith, and for this purpose he had chartered a specia! steamer om Dover to Ostend. At this juncture, the ide of the deman



never from the beginning been so much as

On August 14 the annual German man-

oeuvres commenced, the scheme of operations

being aranged so as to reproduce some of the

features of the disastrous campaign of Jena,

but with a view to showing how under better

staff direction the wreck of the Prussian army

might have been saved and reassembled after

its defeat in the twin battles of Jena and

Auerstadt, October 14, 1906. A considerable

number of British officers of the general staff

attended to witness these very interesting manoeuvres, by permission of the German em-

peror. Newspaper correspondents were not

permitted to attend, but officers of the general

staff on the spot were allowed to transmit to

the British war office narratives of the opera-

tions for communication to the Press. Nobody in England, from the Minister of Foreign Af-

fairs downwards, gave a thought to the Aus-

tralasian dispute, a final settlement of which

seemed likely to ensue within a few days. The

weather at this time was extraordinarily fine;

the "gentle zephyr" blew, scarcely perceptibly,

bassador called at the foreign office, and ig-

noring the fact that the case of the offending

traders had already been dealt with by the

Australian courts, suggested that they should

be surrendered to stand their trial before the

courts of Kaiser Wilhelm Land; the proposed

surrender, he pointed out, would completely

demonstrate the willingness of the British

government to make all the reparation in its

power for the outrage that had been sustained

by the German flag. The Foreign Secretary

met this rather extraordinary proposition

with perfect politeness, but intimated at the

same time that apart from his own objections

to it, he was quite sure that in any case the

Australian Commonwealth would most cer-

tainly reject it. The German Ambassador ex-

hibited neither surprise nor displeasure, he

merely stated that he would report to his Gov-

ernment the reply that had been received, and

took his leave in the usual friendly manner.

The Foreign Secretary felt no alarm, and in-

deed laughed over the interview when casually

mentioning it to the Prime Minister the same

full of highly interesting reports of the manoeuvres, in the course of which the force

representing Blucher's army had now arrived

in the vicinity of Lubeck, hotly pursued by

the superior enemy. Speculation was rife as

to the exact manner in which the crowning

disaster of 1806 would now be avoided, while

some sceptics foretold that in actual fact it

At 6 p.m., Saturday, August 22, the Ger-

man Ambassador revisited the Foreign Office

in order to explain that he was in-

would be repeated almost to the letter.

Meanwhile the newspapers were

On Friday, August 21, the German Am-

and the North sea was dead calm.

in time to announce, as the German Ambassador was about to quit the room, that his Government had decided to support Germany in the present crisis, so that he also was obliged to quit London, which the two diplomatists proceeded to do in company.

At 8.30 p.m. all members of the Cabinet and of the Defence Committee who could be found, together with sundry members of the Army Council and Sea Lords of the Admiralty were assembled in answer to urgent messages which had been sent forth without a moment's delay. Some of the Ministers refused to believe that the final word had yet been said, and vehemently asserted that however brusque the proceedings of the German Government might appear, there was really no intention to proceed to extremities, provided at all events that Great Britain exhibited a reasonably accommodating spirit. Peace, they exclaimed. was more important to the Empire than the liberty of half a dozen Australian traders who were, moreover, in all probability men of little character. The advocates of "Peace at any Price," however, formed but an insignificant minority, and though the matter was debated at considerable length, and with much heat, the more courageous and sensible views of the majority eventually prevailed. After further discussion, during the course of which regret was expressed by several of those present that no Commander of the Forces already existed, it was decided to appoint Lord Roberts generalissimo with almost unlimited powers, civil as well as military, and Sir John French, who reached the council chamber in the nick of time, was directed to commence at once the preparatory measures he considered suitable in anticipation of the arrival of his chief.

It was providential that the message to Lord Roberts had been despatched without loss of time, for at 10 p.m., only about a quarter of an hour after the telegram had been sent off, a terrific explosion took place in the telegraph department of the General Post Office, while about the same hour the telegraph lines from London were cut in all direcions, at various distances from the capital. Very fortunately a telegram of the utmost importance, received via Belgium, had been safely placed in the hands of a messenger before the catastrophe, and this duly reached the authorities at 10.10 p.m. This telegram announced that on the evening of the 20th all British secret agents in Germany had been seized by the police, and that all telegrams purporting to have been sent by any of them since that date must therefore be forgeries. The officers of the British General Staff attending the manoeuvres had also been confined on the morning of the 21st, and large bodies of troops were moving by rail towards the North Sea ports, and also towards Holland. The sender of the telegram had with great difficulty succeeded in passing the frontier, which was strictly guarded. This information proved to be perfectly correct; but one very important item had been omitted from the telegram, having unfortunately feiled to come to the sender's knowledge; namely, that dur-Dutch Minister drove up in great haste, just ing the afternoon and evening of the 21st no

less than 40,000 men were embarked for England, and at the hour when the useful, though incomplete warning was received, many of the transports had already accomplished more than three-fourths of the voyage, while a few fast vessels, which had started early, had almost reached their destinations. Moreover, merchant steamers which had sailed from various ports on the 20th were, though the British authorities knew it not, already busy laying mines in the Straits of Dover, and also in the Thames so as to block up the Nore Division of the Home Fleet. At the Hague Conference, Germany, it will be remembered, declined to enter into any agreement against the use of mines at sea, for the very good reason that the result would have been to weaken very seriously her means of opening a successful campaign against the United Kingdom.

Orders for the immediate mobilisation of the sea and land forces had been despatched from London to all home stations before the collapse of the telegraph; and in the majority of cases, though not in all, had been delivered in due course. Great efforts were made to collect motor-cars, by means of which to gain touch with telegraph offices in the country, and civilian and military telegraph mechanics were also sent to repair the lines as quickly as possible. The news spread like wildfire, so that by midnight quite a large number of motors had been lent or engaged for the public service. By I a.m. the motor service was in working order, and various items of information, usually of an exceedingly unpleasant character, commenced to reach the authorities.

Shortly after I a.m., a message from Sheerress announced that the Dreadnought, while leading the Nore Division of the Home Fleet seawards, had struck a mine, and with difficulty regained port in a sinking condition. Measures were being adopted with a view to effecting the clearance of the fair-way, and meanwhile the rest of the fleet was cor harbor. At 1.30 a.m. the first of a series of reports was received from the south coast, announcing that eastward-bound vessels just arrived in port had been warned by German torpedo-boats not to pass through the Straits of Dover, which were alleged to have been freely sown with mines. At 2.30 a.m. a report was received from Lord Charles Beresford, commanding the Channel Fleet at Portsmouth, that he had received information as to the mines in the Straits of Dover, and was collecting merchant steamers, which he intended to man with skeleton crews of the Royal Navy and send in advance of the Fleet to explode the mines.

At 5 a.m. a report from Dover stated that eighteen German battleships and ten large cruisers, with various smaller craft, had been sighted at 4 a.m.

From 6 a.m. to 7 a.m. a succession of reports announced the arrival of great numbers of German transports, escorted by cruisers, off Cromer, Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft, and Aldeburgh-on-Sea, Troops commenced to land from about 2.30 a.m. Landguard Fort and also the defences on the Harwich side of the Stour estuary had been stormed and captured by surprise at 2.30 a.m. The garrisons had received information of the declaration of war, but many of the men being absent on "weekend" passes, and the Coast Defence Territorials not having yet arrived, sufficient strength was not available for the defence. No immediate attack, had, however, been anticipated, and in almost every case the enemy had gained access to the works before being discovered.

At 8.30 a.m. the officer commanding Norwich reported that his patrols were at 6.45 a.m. engaged with German cyclists in the vicinity of Reedham. By other reports received about the same time it transpired that the bridges over the River Stour at Manningtree, Dedham, Lamarsh and Sudbury had all been destroyed between 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. This latter information had been delayed by a series of breakdowns en route.

At 9 a.m. a report was received from the fficer commanding fourth battalion Suffolk Regiment via Ipswich (7 a.m.), that with about 300 of his battalion, still in process of assembly, and L Battery R.H.A., he is engaged with German cyclists on the River Deben about Wickham Market.

From 10 a.m. to 12 noon there arrived a succession of reports to the effect that not is not a country adapted for the employment less than 40,000 men had landed about Cromer, of large forces of cavalry or artillery, and the

and 10,000 about Great Yarmouth and Aldeburgh-on-Sea respectively, while transports in large numbers were landing men or arriving off the coast in the vicinity of the two latter places. A fourth fleet of transports, escorted by ten battleships, was reported to be approaching Harwich at 8 a.m., apparently from Dutch

ports. At 11 a.m. Lord Charles Bereseford reported that at 9 a.m. he had attempted to send merchant vessels through the Straits of Dover, but without success, the steamers having with one exception been sunk by the fire of the German fleet before reaching the mine field. Loss of life not great in the circumstances. He ions. As for fighting value, when actually arproposed to collect other steamers, and renew nis effort after dark.

The further information at the disposal of the British authorities up to 3 p.m. disclosed the following situation:

Armies, numbering about 40,000 men each, are on shore about Cromer, Great Yarmouth, and Aldeburgh-on-Sea, while a fourth army, estimated at 30,000 men, has landed about

The Straits of Dover being blocked with mines, the Channel Fleet and the Portsmouth and Plymouth Divisions of the Home fleet are for a time unable to take action against the hostile fleets; and the Nore Division of the Home fleet, although no longer hindered by mines in the Thames, is incapable of offering any serious opposition to the superior forces at sea against it, more especially as the Dreadnought has already been rendered hors de

Various local forces, in pursuance of orders or on the initiative of their commanders, are endeavoring to delay the enemy, whose cyclistscouts have already penetrated some distance inland at various points.

Further reports continued to arrive, and by 4 p.m. the information to hand left little doubt that the strength of the enemy's forces actually landed in England was roughly as follows:

 

 About Cromer
 40,000

 About Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft
 40,000

 About Aldeburgh-on-Sea
 40,000

 About Harwich
 30,000

Total ...... 150,000

The first arrivals consisted of infantry in cluding a considerable force of cyclists, with which our local troops have been engaged all day. The infantry were conveyed in large ocean steamers, and were landed on the beach. Small forces of cavalry and artillery and transport were subsequently landed at the quays of various harbors, from smaller steamers which commenced to arrive during the disembarkation of the infantry. The Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft force is reported to be marching rapidly on Norwich, and the Cromer force to be heading towards the west of that place. The Adleburgh-on-Sea force is moving inland in a more leisurely manner, while that of Harwich, with the exception of cyclists who have been encountered along the line, Bradfield-Wicks-Oakley, shows no immediate sign of any intention to do more than deploy into position to cover the harbor.

It would be useless to speculate as to the exact nature of the preliminary arrangements that would in the circumstances suggested have been made by Sir John French during the night, or to pretend to indicate the further ac-tion of Lord Roberts after his arrival in London from Scotland; nor is it necessary to argue at length the question of whether the Germans could actually prepare and embark so large an expedition with such secrecy and despatch that the actual arrival of the advanced guard should take place within a few hours after the first warning of danger reached England. What is far more important is to consider the numbers and value of the forces immediately at our disposal to resist such an invasion if made. It may be that the Germans would need another twenty-four hours, and if such be the case, so much the better for ourselves; but for the present purpose it seems desirable to assume for the sake of argument that the rapidity of the suggested attack does not transgress the limits of at least remote possibility. It is quite certain that one Atlantic "liner" of, say, 10,000 tons, could convey 5,000 infantry from Hamburg to the Sussex or Essex coast in less than twenty-four hours, and that, assuming favorable weather, the men could be landed within three hours on the beach by means of the steel "lighters" which have already been prepared for such enterprises. What one such steamer could do could be done by more, and a simultaneous landing is only a question of the available extent of beach. There are miles of suitable beach on our east coast. England

small proportion of these two arms of the service required could easily be landed, after the infantry had made good their footing on shore, by means of smaller steamers brought alongside the quays of the few suitable harbors. Of course, if we could defeat and drive the infantry into the sea without delay that would be quite another story; obviously prompt action on our part is urgently called for, and it now remains to state what means are at our disposal for that purpose.

We will assume that General French has done his best to arrange that the enemy shall not disembark and advance entirely unopposed, and that he has ordered the concentration of the available forces in accordance with the "Defence Scheme" as worked out by the General Staff, subject to any modifications dictated by the actual situation.

It may fairly be assumed that the Militia (now called the "Special Reserve") would require at least twenty-four hours to assemble, and from thirty-six to forty-eight hours to reach the selected points of concentration in the vicinity of the scene of action. For immediate use the Militia may therefore be struck out, with the exception of a few local battalrived, we may take it that one German regular would count as much as three newly em-

bodied militiamen. The Volunteers and Yeomanry, or "Territorial Forces," could be assembled rather, more rapidly than the Militia; and scratch detachments of the local corps, gradually reinforced and organized as the assembly of the men progressed, might probably be able to offer resistance to the enemy's cyclist-scouts within a comparatively short time after the alarm had been given. The assembly of brigades conveyed to the scene of action by rail would, however, require time according to distance. At all events, like the Militia, the bulk of the Volunteer Force must be left out of count for immediate use. The fighting value of the Volunteers may be taken at much the same as that of the Militia. The Volunteers are more intelligent men, but as a rule are even less instructed than the Militia. The Yeomanry, for their numbers, would prove much more -useful than either if they had

For immediate service the Commander-in-Chief would have only the Regular troops, and even these, in the circumstances, in case of an alarm raised late on a Saturday night. could not be despatched by rail until after a considerable interval. We will, however, ignore all the difficulties, assume perfect preparation, and that few of the men are absent from their quarters on "week-end" pass. It is sufficient now to deal with the nominally

available numbers. There are in England thirteen cavalry regiments capable of turning out some 4100 sabres. Of these thirteen regiments, ten are quartered at Aldershot and at stations north of the Thames, the three others being at Canterbury, Shorncliffe and Tidworth respectively. There are fifty-seven battalions of Infantry in England, Wales and Scotland, capable of turning out some 35,000 men and boys. Of this total there are about 15,000 in the Aldershot command, including the 4th brigade (Guards) in London; and adding to these the battalions at stations in England north of the Thames, this combination amounts to about 12,200 men. The battalions south of the Thames and in Scotland, with one battalion in Wales, number about 13,800, and so raise the total fighting strength to about 35,000. As regards artillery, we need not trouble ourselves; the batteries at Aldershot and Colchester alone would suffice. England, as aforesaid, is not a suitable country for the employment of a numerous artillery. But Ammuni tion Columns would require to be improvised, and many of the batteries have but four gans for which teams are available.

We have already given the Germans credit for the very utmost they could possibly have accomplished within the time allowed them, and we will therefore take an equally optimistic view of our own proceedings.

Let it be assumed that within twenty-four hours after the first alarm all the Regular Cavalry and Infantry in Great Britain, with a force of artillery considered sufficient for the purpose, have been concentrated upon the points selected by Lord Roberts, that local Territorials have relieved the Regulars quartered in fortresses, such as Portsmouth and Plymouth, and that the regular reservists are being rapidly despatched in considerable numbers to join their units at the appointed rendezvous. Thus Lord Roberts might have under his hand by midnight on Sunday, August 23, roughly speaking, 45,000 combatants, which number might by the subsequent arrival of reservists be raised to 50,000 by noon on Monday, the 24th. But by this time the Cromer and Yarmouth German armies would probably have approached one another so nearly that the defeat of either could scarcely be effected before the other could come to its assistance. The army of Harwich may be as-

(Continued on Page 19.)