

however, always be a need for NATO as an instrument for building up North Atlantic co-operation and development. The Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that he did not think it unwise to emphasize that the United Nations still remained the primary basis for international co-operation and peace if only it could be made to work, but that until such time as the United Nations became a fully effective organization for these purposes, it would be necessary for the Western nations to support NATO.

Mr. Fleming said that he agreed with part of what the Minister had said but that he did not think it was wise to give the impression that we were weakening in our support of NATO, or in our estimate of the danger which led to the creation of NATO in the first place. The Minister agreed, and emphasized the fact that NATO remained the sheet anchor of the Canadian defence policy at the present time and that the Canadian Government was not likely to abandon NATO unless something better could be obtained.

FORMOSA, QUEMOY AND MATSU

Mr. Pearson said that during the past year there appeared to have been little outward change in the situation in Formosa and the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The Nationalist Government continued to hold these islands with large forces. Most of the men who made up these forces were still drawn from those who were evacuated from the mainland in 1949, but a few had escaped from the mainland in recent years and there was an increasing proportion of Formosans in Chiang Kai-Shek's forces.

Mr. Coldwell enquired whether or not the Formosans were being conscripted. The Minister replied that he thought so, but he would endeavour to obtain more definite information. He went on to say that the United States, under its mutual defence treaty with the Nationalist Government, was helping to train and supply Chiang Kai-Shek's forces and provide sea and air protection for Formosa in accordance with United States policy which had already been declared. A substantial proportion of the Nationalist forces were stationed on the offshore islands, in order to defend them against attack from the mainland. Mr. Pearson stated that in his opinion the principal change which had taken place in this area during the past 12 months had been the growth of the hope that the Chinese Communists had realized that there would be serious repercussions if they were to attempt an attack on Quemoy and Matsu. There was still some irregular firing between the islands and the mainland, but the hope had grown that the Communists would not attack the islands.

Mr. Coldwell enquired how far the islands of Quemoy and Matsu were from the mainland and how far from Formosa. Mr. Pearson replied that the nearest off-shore island was about 4 miles from the mainland and about 80 or 90 miles from Formosa. He continued by pointing out that the United States was committed to the defence of Formosa against attack by the Chinese Communists and stated that the fact that no such attack has materialized during the last year would suggest that the Chinese Communists realize the probable effect of such an attack.

Mr. Pearson pointed out that the United States position in regard to Quemoy and Matsu was less clearly defined than was the case with Formosa. The United States has assumed the responsibility of protecting territories which in the judgment of the President of the United States were related to the de-