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PAPERS ON INDIA.

We publish the following extracts from an able article in the last *Edinburgh Review* on Indian affairs, to which we append a summary of the latest news and a translation of very interesting letters from a French Canadian officer in the British Army, Mr. Joly, son of G. P. Joly, Esquire, of Lotbinière, published in the *Canadien*. Our readers will be able to gather from the whole, a very correct view of this all absorbing subject.

The letters of Mr. Joly record with the most admirable simplicity a deed of heroism which does him the greatest honor. This young officer is the grandson of the Hon. Mr. De Lotbinière, who was the second speaker of the House of Assembly of Lower Canada.

INDIA AND THE SEPOYS PREVIOUS TO THE MUTINY.

We cannot permanently hold India by force alone. We may break down a native power; we may crush the rebellion of an army, although it carries the arms we have provided, and moves in accordance with the lessons we have taught. But we cannot do this in defiance to the active wishes of the great mass of the people. If not the thousands merely, but the millions were now against us, we should soon be swept into the sea. We may treble or quadruple our European forces in India, but still we could not permanently hold the country if the people were against us. Not to be against us is to be for us. We can expect no more than passive consent; but with that passive consent, the result partly of our efforts to govern well, partly of the natural apathy of the people, we may hold India in spite even of the rebellion of an army.

We do not underrate the importance of such a rebellion—a rebellion of a hundred thousand men, trained in the discipline of European warfare, with arms and equipments of the latest European invention, and munitions of war the produce of our own laboratories

and workshops. But the most violent disorders are not always the most fatal. A native government might be overthrown by the revolt of an army more readily than a foreign one. The native government has nothing to fall back upon but the assistance of an ally, and such intervention is well nigh certain to seal the death-warrant of the threatened state. The foreign power, on the other hand, has the resources of the mother-country at its command; and though the sacrifice of blood and treasure in such a struggle is terrible to contemplate, the national supremacy is not jeopardised, so long as the people are quiescent. There is nothing more fearful in history than this revolt of the Bengal army; but a military revolt is not a popular revolution.

We have the strongest conviction, indeed, that they who, in connection with this subject, talk or write about popular revolutions know little about the history of India or the genius of the people. It would be curious to ascertain what proportion of the population of India really care—or we may say, really know—anything about the mutiny in the Bengal army. In the neighbourhood of the large towns which have been the scenes of military revolt, and along the lines of road by which the mutineers have moved from one place to another, the populace have been necessarily cognisant of the movement, and the worst class (including the sweepings of the gaols), eager for plunder, have taken part in it, and sometimes against it. (1) But when we consider the immense extent of the country, the remote places in which vast multitudes of the people reside, their imperfect means of communication, their general ignorance of what is passing beyond their own immediate vicinity, and the apathy and indolence of the national character, it is easy to understand how events, the intelligence of which rapidly penetrates every corner of the British islands, may have little effect upon the teeming millions of such a country as India. The people of India have often passed from one rule to another without a voice in the revolution, with scarcely a thought of the change. Their own internal institutions have withstood the revolutions of Mogul and Malhratta; and except when the horae-men of one power or the other, have swept through their village like a whirlwind, carrying everything before it, the daily lives of the rural classes have been little influenced by the mutations of sovereignty. "It is a singular fact," wrote one who knew the people of India well, (2) "that the peasantry, and I may say the landed interest of the country generally, have never been friends of any existing government; have never considered their interests and that of the government the same; and consequently have never felt any desire for its success or duration. They have submitted, therefore, patiently to one change after another; but they have never taken any active steps to promote it. Our Govern-

(1) The Goojurs, for example, have plundered the mutinous sepoy with as little hesitation as they evinced in the plunder of the Europeans.

(2) The late Sir W. H. Sleeman, "Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official."