

with an expression of sympathy and a request for evidence to support SVM allegations concerning the disappearance of Colonel Nam. The result was an adjournment of the meeting, which was not unfavourable to us as we could afford to wait.

5. On October 17 the Foreign Ministry again wrote to the Commission expressing surprise that "after more than two weeks since the Commission was officially seized with the case the Commission has not yet taken any decision before a so characterized act of provocation on the part of the Hanoi authorities." The GRVN took the unprecedented step of demanding to be informed within one week of the stand of the Commission regarding the measures taken against the Hanoi authorities.

6. Meanwhile, on October 17, the body of Colonel Nam, showing signs of torture, was found and identified and another Foreign Ministry note was received on October 18 with the details. At this point the Poles began to realize that their refusal to express sympathy had roused the indignation of the South Vietnamese and that the ugly climate could lead to violence. Only then did the Commission come to life as an organic body and the three Delegations agreed at an informal meeting to express deep sorrow and condolences to the Foreign Minister and the family of Colonel Nam. This did not assuage Vietnamese feelings, however, and ostensibly on the request of Madame Nam, the Poles were refused permission to pay their respects to the body of Colonel Nam during the evening of October 18.

7. At another informal meeting on that day the Commission agreed, after initial opposition from the Polish Delegation, to send another letter to the SVM requesting the Mission to furnish prima facie evidence in support of the allegations contained in the three above-mentioned Foreign Ministry notes so that the Commission could consider the case (see our telegram CCIC 4407 of October 18).†

8. A large state funeral was held for Colonel Nam on October 20 which senior Canadian and Indian personnel attended but from which members of the Polish Delegation were again deliberately excluded. Eulogies delivered at the grave made apparent that the régime has established Colonel Nam as a martyr against Communism. Then began the anti-IC and anti-Polish campaign of press comment and demonstrations which, despite repeated claims by the SVM that the reaction is spontaneous and uncontrollable, we have good reason to believe is government-sponsored and supported. This campaign has continued with varying intensity throughout the month. In all fairness, however, we must add that, aside from the discriminatory treatment meted out to the Polish Delegation since October 25 (non-provision of transport and household services), the anti-IC campaign has been well-ordered and has so far not gotten out of hand, although there have been threats which make the situation uneasy. The harassment of the Polish Delegation continues in spite of strong representations made on numerous occasions to the Foreign Minister by the Commission as a body, the Secretary-General, the Commissioners individually and the British and U.S. Ambassadors. The Canadian Delegation has itself made it clear to the Foreign Ministry and the SVM that the discriminatory treatment must stop if we, as a Delegation, are to do the best job possible and if the IC is to function effectively. We have been careful to point out that the onus for the Poles' departure, should they do so in the face of harassment, would rest unequivocally with the Vietnamese. We have also tried to avoid any precipitous action by the Commission which would make it difficult for either the Commission or the GRVN to withdraw gracefully from an extreme position. The Polish Delegation, for instance, insisted at a formal meeting on October 31 that the South be cited immediately for non-cooperation while the Indian Delegation wanted to send a strong letter of protest with a time limit demanding the restoration of services to the Polish Delegation. We were able to postpone both of these undesirable alternatives in the belief that the GRVN would forward a formal letter suggesting that the Commission leave Saigon and operate from the North, at least for the time being. Notice of this possible manoeuvre came