

2. You should in particular impress upon your colleagues two key points which we believe must be recognized if negotiations on this subject are to produce rapid agreement:

(i) that differences between the two sides have already been reduced to such an extent that there is no technical barrier which could not be removed by a willingness to compromise on details;

(ii) that unless a final effort is made to achieve complete agreement on this problem, there can be no hope of progress on general disarmament and the Conference as a whole will be likely to degenerate into a profitless debate ending in the realization that the ENDC has not been capable of fulfilling the tasks given it by the United Nations.

If we are to get these points across I believe that you must play a leading part in pressing all delegations to realize frankly that tactical and political considerations which have affected their attitudes to date cannot be allowed at this juncture to stand in the way of an agreement which is within the grasp of the Conference and which is vital to its continued existence as a forum for realistic negotiations on the whole range of disarmament questions. The remaining differences of view between the two sides – particularly the “numbers game” on which so much time has already been spent – will never be resolved unless and until all concerned face up to the extremely grave consequences of failure. At this crucial stage in the Conference, it is our role to bring home to all the participants that without early agreement on a test ban the survival of the Eighteen-Nation Conference would be placed in jeopardy.

3. In your private conversation with Foster and Godber you should also draw on additional considerations set out in the following paragraph addressed to Mr. Drew.

4. FOR LONDON (PERSONAL FOR MR. DREW). I would like you to speak to the Foreign Secretary along the above lines as soon as possible, making use of General Burns' latest statement to the Committee (DisarmDel telegram 50 February 22) for further background. You should impress upon Lord Home the fundamental point that absence of a test ban will mean renewed testing and all that this would imply for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons (as mentioned by President Kennedy in his press conference February 21 and reported in Washington telegram 598 February 22<sup>†</sup>),<sup>61</sup> as well as sacrificing the possibility of a world wide verification system major elements of which are already agreed. Moreover, it is my conviction that unless a breakthrough can be achieved at this time on a test ban, the possibility of progress on disarmament would be put off indefinitely and the West might suffer a serious set-back as a result of what could be interpreted by public opinion as insistence on a degree of inspection not warranted by technical requirements. You should make plain to him that in my view these are the main considerations which now have to be weighed in the balance in determining the Western attitude to the question of on-site inspection.

[H.C.] GREEN

<sup>61</sup> Voir/See “The President’s News Conference of February 21, 1963,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 201-209.