

undertake a disarming first-strike at this time, and that neither looks to achieve such a capability.

● (2020)

The first use of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, is quite a different matter. It is also at the very heart of NATO's doctrine of flexible response, which is that any aggression would be responded to at a level and by the means necessary to halt it. Fundamental to the strategy is the need to maintain all options open to the western alliance. To foreclose any option—for example, by declaring that NATO would not be the first to use nuclear weapons—would convey quite the wrong signal to the other side at this time. More directly, such a declaration would be seen by our European allies as a withdrawal of the American nuclear guarantee from Europe, a guarantee which has played a major role in keeping the peace there for over 30 years.

This motion, while similar to the recent proposal put forward by the former U.S. secretary of defence, Robert McNamara, has conveniently refused to recognize a fundamental condition upon which McNamara's renouncement of first-use was based; that is, that the only responsible way in which the allied governments could adopt a no-first-use policy would be on the basis of an improvement in western conventional forces in Europe. Not unnaturally, this crucial condition has attracted a good deal less attention than has the no-first-use proposal.

Hon. members opposite, unfortunately, have not learned from the past, or the present. In committee yesterday I was questioned on what I meant when I referred to Pax Sovietica. I ask them not to ask me but to ask those who have strayed in some way from the Soviet path and from the strict Soviet line. The Hungarians in 1956, the Czechs in 1968, the Poles in 1981 and the Afghans know full well what the term "Pax Sovietica" means. Soviet actions in these instances indicate clearly that the western alliance must remain very vigilant.

**Mr. Ogle:** Mr. Speaker, would the minister tell the House when he really believes a freeze would be possible? I understood he was indicating there could be a freeze.

**The Acting Speaker (Mr. Ethier):** Order, please. I thought the hon. member was rising on a point of order. If he is rising for the purpose of asking a question, that could be done only with unanimous consent. Is there unanimous consent?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Ogle:** Mr. Speaker, the minister has indicated he believes a freeze would be possible at a certain level of weaponry. That is what I understood, in any event. When does the minister think it would be possible for that to take place?

**Mr. Lamontagne:** Mr. Speaker, I think it is very clear that at the moment a freeze would be very unequal. If a football game is stopped in the middle of the game and the score is three to nothing, that would not be very equal.

### Supply

**Mr. Deans:** This is not quite the same.

**Mr. Lamontagne:** I know that is not the point. I will get to the point. We want to do something better than a freeze. Our aim is to reduce to the lowest level possible the nuclear strength, the nuclear force of both sides. For example, the U.S.A. has asked the U.S.S.R. to remove the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5. If the Soviets did that, we would have a certain equality as far as this type of armament is concerned.

What I cannot understand is that everyone seems to be scared of a weapon, the Cruise missile, which is not yet in a position to hit anybody. It is just in the testing stage. On the other hand, no one is afraid of the huge nuclear arsenal of the SS-4, the SS-5 and the SS-20.

**Mr. Deans:** I am petrified.

**Mr. Lamontagne:** Why is the hon. member so afraid and why does he want disarmament right away, before we achieve a certain parity so that we are able to have a credible deterrence so that the U.S.S.R. can be given the incentive to sit down with us and seriously negotiate peace and disarmament?

**Miss Pauline Jewett (New Westminster-Coquitlam):** Mr. Speaker, the evidence before the subcommittee on security and disarmament was always interesting and often contradictory. One of the areas in which it was contradictory was the very one about which the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne) has just been talking, namely, is there or is there not rough global parity between the two sides? This has also been the subject of a great deal of discussion in the United States and Europe. I find it very misleading to be told by the minister that there is no such global parity. In his capacity as Minister of National Defence it seems to me the minister should be providing us with the best estimate which can possibly be made on the question of global parity, but the minister is not doing so. We all know about the SS-20. We also know about the submarines which can demolish every city in the Soviet Union. We know about those. We also know—and a great many authorities have said exactly the same thing over the past many months, including many to the committee—that if we look at this matter in a global fashion, we see that there is now rough parity. I agree with the minister that it is better to move toward a nuclear freeze in a position of rough parity than in any other. Because there is rough parity now, the movement for a global freeze has attained large dimensions.

I am sure the minister reads and respects Paul C. Warnke, who was the arms control and disarmament adviser in the previous U.S. administration. Paul Warnke has stated quite clearly and flatly that there is now rough parity. He says:

—in the over-all strategic balance there is certainly no Soviet advantage. In the most significant respects, such as survivability, the edge is ours. If an immediate freeze could . . . be achieved, the existing situation of mutual deterrence would be preserved. Neither side could possibly anticipate profiting from the initiation of a nuclear war. The country attacked would retain the capability to inflict comparable devastation on its attacker . . . A freeze is the necessary partner of reductions.