

*Supply—External Affairs*

calls for the greatest tact and care and display of responsible firmness, if we are going to avoid the cataclysmic consequences of the most terrible experience ever to confront mankind. That is the one thing we have to keep in mind, the consequences to mankind of a world that will be at least partially destroyed and whose civilization would be seriously affected by the consequences that would flow as the result of a nuclear conflict. We in the west must never forget the one, paramount, overriding factor in this day of psychological cold war; that is, that we must never have a nuclear war if that can possibly be avoided. We must think of the innocent men and women of the world who have nothing to do with the formulation of policy. We must think of those who are in no way responsible for this situation except by virtue of their being human beings. We must think of our young people and of the tests they are making of our capacity to resolve this problem. We must also think of the statements they make from time to time that we, an older generation, have made a mess which perhaps only they can correct.

All of this we must bear in mind. Yet at the same time, because of what inevitably confronts us, we cannot fail to recognize that there is a great cleavage between a world that enjoys freedom and a world based upon totalitarian power that denies freedom. This is the terrible dilemma into which we have been placed. Our moral heritage forbids us from starting a nuclear war, yet the side in this historical struggle between tyranny and freedom which first enunciates the abandonment of nuclear war as a basis for diplomatic policy must lose the struggle. This is a central axiom, because if one side eliminates the possibility of nuclear war—and this is the dilemma as I see it—it would be sufficient for the adversary simply to menace severely enough with the threat of nuclear destruction so as to force a negotiated capitulation. We must be prepared, I agree, to go to the limit on issues within the cold war. We must be prepared to do the ultimate concerning Berlin in order to prevent a war over Berlin.

I do not know what President Kennedy told Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet union in Vienna but when the president was making that important journey to visit Khrushchev I did think that he may have sought to establish in the mind of Khrushchev the ultimate intentions of the United States so that there could be no suggestion in history later on, if there is going to be any history, that the Soviet union was not properly warned by its main adversary; and so that no one could say in this period that Russia had been ill-

advised, as some historians suggest Hitler had been ill-advised, as to the course the United Kingdom proposed to take in regard to the events that led to the second world war.

The Prime Minister spoke of negotiation in his speech as did President Kennedy in his. I recall the statement made by the Prime Minister in this house before adjournment to the effect that while there could not be negotiations on certain matters and no compromise on essentials, there was an area for compromise and negotiation. I cannot help thinking that while that is undoubtedly the correct position to take, Chancellor Adenauer had views at the time which suggested that compromise was out of the question. Negotiations so far, and understandably because of their very nature, have been fuzzy and not fully defined, partially I readily admit at once because, as the Prime Minister said, to reveal negotiations would freeze our diplomacy, and partially because we are unclear sometimes and perhaps at the moment as to what is actually negotiable.

But let us clear up one fundamental point; that negotiation assumes an attitude on both sides at least genuinely to want to seek the possibility of a solution. If one side has no intention of seeking a solution but is only sitting back waiting for opportunities to make propaganda assaults and to play among the divisions of the western nations, then there is manifestly no certainty of the effectiveness of that kind of negotiation.

I believe personally there is much evidence to suggest that the Soviet union has now no intention of seeking final solutions so we must never allow ourselves, as I see it, to be duped by prospects of grand conferences to resolve all our problems. We have as a precedent the ill fated summit meeting of May 1960. I do not mean by this that we should refuse to have conferences. I do not mean that the President of the United States should have necessarily refused to meet Premier Khrushchev. That is not what I am saying. I am pointing out that we now must surely have behind us sufficient evidence to realize there is no solution to the vital problems of our time merely by conference. But we must always assume that there are grounds for negotiation.

What is negotiable, then? First of all let us clearly state what is not negotiable. Not negotiable, I believe, is the freedom of one single free individual in West Berlin. Not negotiable is one square yard of free men's land in West Berlin. In the field of diplomatic negotiations I support the policies of the government as generally stated. I believe this government in turn, particularly on the basis of the statement made by the Prime Minister,