

national export controls. Mutimer contends that these three levels are in conflict. The root of the tension is the reliance of these structures on technology denial.

The UN Register has a different foundation in that it is designed to promote transparency. In turn, transparency will encourage arms restraint in two ways: first, it will produce accurate information, thereby eliminating the necessity to base arms procurement on worse-case scenarios; and, second, it will create a device capable of detecting destabilizing arms accumulations, allowing the international community time to react. In addition, the Register differs in that it has no formal verification scheme. Instead, it employs a cross-checking system (i.e. since both states should report the same transfer, their submissions should match).

In its first annual report, the Register contained reports from less than one-half of UN member states. Despite this low participation rate, it covered 98% of arms exports and 65% of arms imports. Nevertheless, Mutimer suggests improving the Register in the following ways: first, it must secure wider participation; second, it must improve the definitions of key terms; and, finally, it should include military holdings and procurement through national production.

Arms control based on technology denial does not work. Efforts at arms control should address the problems which prompt states to acquire arms. The Register is designed as a confidence-building measure. Its development will help eliminate instability and uncertainty in the international community, thereby reducing the need for states to acquire arms. Mutimer argues that the Register is off to a good start. However, if it is to fulfill its early promise it must be supplemented by regional confidence-building measures.

433. Pearson, Frederic S. and Michael Brzoska. "The Register as an Early Warning System: Case Studies and Empirical Evidence of the Role of Conventional Arms in Conflict." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, University of Bradford: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 225-250.

Pearson and Brzoska examine a series of post World War II conflicts to determine the relationship between arms accumulations and the outbreak of war. They conclude that the UN Register of Conventional Arms must be modified if it hopes to serve as an early warning device. Since some of the wars examined resulted in part from arms build-ups through national production (e.g. Falklands war), Pearson and Brzoska suggest that the Register include details of arms negotiations and domestic production rates. Moreover, one of the problems with the Register is its inability to warn of destabilizing accumulations of arms which take place in under a year. In addition, the difficulty of defining what constitutes an "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms" is evidenced, for example, by continued U.S. military support for Baghdad into 1990. As the Iraqi case demonstrates, arms suppliers often have a different interpretation of what is destabilizing than do arms importers.