

little to deter the use of covert facilities and activities for the development of weapons. Challenge inspections will not routinely be able to detect violations, but their existence will be a deterrent to cheating and may trigger a synergistic effect when combined with other collection methods.

- Verification regimes among developed, democratic nations will continue to be based on the assumption that there will be an increasing degree of co-operation.
- Economic and budgetary constraints will make verification synergies and greater inter-operability among verification regimes even more necessary.
- There will be an increased sharing of information from NTM and NIM among coalition partners and allies. More data from NTM will be declassified and available on a global basis. NIM, which includes HUMINT (collection by human sources) and the analysis of open-source information such as the media or commercial satellite photography, will be of great importance. Commercial sensors will be used for many monitoring functions, including monitoring unstable regions. There will be additional calls for the development of MTM and/or ITM.
- Increased transparency will not be without its costs. The extensive on-site inspections associated with the CWC and other agreements will raise concerns about loss of sensitive or proprietary information. Furthermore, challenge inspections will offer lessons to cheaters on how to avoid detection of non-compliant activities. The media may present the inspections as intrusions on sovereignty or individual rights, leading to public outcry.
- Arms control agreements that constrain proliferation will gain in importance. The NPT will be extended, the CWC will enter into force with minimum difficulty, and the BTWC will be strengthened by a verification regime consisting primarily of CBMs. In all

three cases, pariah states will either not sign or continue to cheat on these non-proliferation agreements.

- The CTBT will be negotiated and signed, but not yet ratified by all the key states. Pending ratification of a CTBT, a moratorium on testing may be observed. A ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons will be negotiated during the latter half of this period of time.
- START I and II reductions will proceed, Russia and Ukraine will reach accommodation on key military issues, and Ukraine and Kazakhstan will accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. The *five* major nuclear weapons states will continue to be under international pressure to negotiate reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
- As CBMs increase in importance as measures for enhancing regional and local stability, differentiation will be made about their roles. In Europe, CBMs will be seen more as evidence of enhanced transparency than as a way to confirm compliance. In the less stable regions, for example, Asia and the Middle East, CBMs will be viewed as means to enhance security or to bring about and sustain peace.
- The pressures on the United Nations to respond in unstable regional situations will increase dramatically.
- The problems facing UN forces involved in peace operations will become more complex as the lines between the roles of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace-building become even more fluid.

