

to reinforce Canadian forces in West Germany up to divisional strength if necessary appears to revert to a World War II scenario, despite the fact that some 4,000 theatre nuclear weapons still remain in Western Europe. In both cases, the "Canada first" views of the critics, allied to a regional cooperation regime in the North, may make more political sense for Canadians, if not for our allies.

That is the rub. The European allies, including Norway and Denmark, are not yet prepared to regard the Soviet Union as a partner, rather than an adversary, for security purposes, whether in the North or anywhere else. They continue to depend on the United States as the guarantor of their military security, and there is little prospect of early change in this dependency relationship. Defence cooperation among the European allies is growing, and a conference on disarmament in Europe may soon begin, but in neither case is it reasonable to expect dramatic results in the near future.

On the other hand, an agreement to reduce significantly the numbers of strategic warheads held by the superpowers (START) can be anticipated in the next year or two, barring unforeseen political changes in the USSR or in Eastern Europe. As already noted, limits on cruise missiles appear to be the main obstacle to agreement, provided a formula can be found to prevent the construction of anti-ballistic missile defences in the next ten years or so. Canada has a major interest in both issues, for on their resolution depends decisions about the kind of military facilities and equipment which may be needed in the North. For example, if Canadian nuclear submarines are required in part to deter Soviet submarines from entering the Canadian Arctic in times of tension or war, would this task have the same importance in circumstances which limited Soviet capacities to launch cruise missiles from submarines deployed in northern waters, or in transit through such waters? In any event, how plausible is a scenario which envisages a Canadian contribution to a "war-fighting" capability in the North or in the Atlantic without the use of nuclear weapons? Would such a contribution help to deter war? Or is the main concern the control of Canadian waters and airspace in peacetime?

Here we face the ongoing dilemma of Canadian "sovereignty" and the role of the Canadian armed forces in peacetime protection and control. If the threat of a Soviet attack or incursion is real, then clearly the combined defence assets of the US and Canada, not to mention other allies, need to be mobilized to meet it. The purpose of an alliance is to share the resources of the allies to deter attack, and to repel it if necessary. In the case of North America, the US obviously provides the bulk of such resources, and in particular the capacity to deter hostile air and naval forces. Why then should Canada invest in equipment, such as submarines, which add little to this capacity? But if the main purpose of Canadian forces in North America is "control" of Canadian maritime areas and airspace, the task becomes virtually unlimited. Few countries have so much space to control if

this notion is taken literally.

"Sovereignty" is often a magic formula that tends to defy close scrutiny, but in a world of sovereign states the capacity to know who or what threatens national frontiers is certainly one of its marks. Forming NORAD was a step in the direction of exerting *joint* control of continental airspace and therefore the assertion of Canadian sovereignty, provided it was clearly defensive in nature and not linked to arrangements which appeared to threaten Soviet security. US naval strategy, on the other hand, appears to assume that the Arctic will be an offensive theatre of operations requiring the presence of US submarines in peacetime. The dilemma remains stark. A contribution to the *defence* of North America in the form of nuclear submarines is difficult to justify on these grounds alone. The provision of nuclear submarines as an additional means of asserting *control* of Canadian waters would appear to be partly (perhaps mainly) directed at Canada's principal ally.

Nuclear submarines are only the most dramatic example of a more general dilemma — the priority to be attached to defence expenditures relative to other public expenditures. A clear and present danger to the security of the West, as perceived in the 1950s, provided its own justification for defence expenditures of up to six percent of gross national product. As in Korea in 1950, or in Afghanistan in 1980, the US perceived such a danger and acted accordingly. Canada followed suit in 1950, but not in 1980, and it seems unlikely, with Gorbachev in power, that such a danger can be made persuasive in 1988. Moreover, a Canadian contribution to European defence is no longer a compelling cause for most Canadians, despite general approval for Canadian membership in NATO. Finally, the costs of protection against other threats to individual well-being and to the natural environment are bound to increase for the indefinite future.

Canada can hardly plead poverty as an excuse for cutting defence costs (we have the fifth largest per capita income in the world and the tenth largest gross national product). The problem is not one of absolute costs but rather of costs versus benefits. No Canadian political party could allow our armed forces to "rust out," or to be incapable of defending themselves. The answer rather lies in re-examining commitments which may not be justified in the light of changing circumstances and of competing alternatives, or, at the least, of making such commitments compatible with equipment that is multi-purpose. Tanks, for example, serve no purpose in Canada, and the purchase of a new model for Canadian Forces in Europe can only imply the intention to keep such forces there for several more years.

At the same time we ought to give greater attention to the kinds of measures of demilitarization in the North which are practical and verifiable. The current directions of Soviet policy suggest that such measures are not implausible. The evident pressures on Soviet allies and