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The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1873.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be *pre-paid*. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and in the corner the words "Printer's copy" written; and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.

The right of insurrection established by the Treaty of Paris, in 1783, persistently taught and claimed by the politicians of the Republic, which the blunders of English statesmen, the treason and treachery of English political leaders and the imbecility of English Generals, called into being, bore its natural fruit. A minority of the people of the United States in 1861 declared their connection with the Federal Government dissolved, and organized a Government of their own, under the style and title of the "Confederate States" of North America."

As a matter of course, the Congress and people of the United States acted precisely in the same manner as the Parliament and people of Great Britain did in 1776—determined to deal with them as

rebels against legal and just authority, with this difference, however, that while Great Britain labored under the disadvantage of having all her rivals—which comprised every State in Europe—side with her rebellious subject, the United States had the advantage of the active friendship and forbearance of the British people and Government, and consequently, while the Confederate States had their status as belligerents acknowledged, they received no material aid from European powers, the accession of any one of whom to their cause would have decided the contest in the first campaign.

As it was, however, a war of Titans was waged for four years, for the first three with success inclining to the Confederates, owing to the large accession of trained military talent which flocked to their standard, with knowledge acquired under the flag of the United States, and arms which had been prepared for her defence and use.

At the commencement of the contest such a thing as strategy was not dreamt of: it was simply a war of posts along an undefined frontier line, and the only objective which the Southern leaders appear to have had was the capture and occupation of WASHINGTON, on those occasions when they found it necessary to assume the offensive; without a fleet and almost without communication with the sea board except by smuggling, one or two active cruisers flying the Confederate flag swept the Federal commercial marine out of existence, and it has not yet recovered the blow. This fact alone would be sufficient to prove that, with very little assistance indeed, the Secessionists would have successfully established the logical sequence of the doctrine of the right of Insurrection.

In the third year of its existence, the contest had assumed precisely the same phase as that between England and her revolted colonists in 1781—in other words, it was to be decided by the success of operations carried on in front of and on the peninsula enclosed by the York and James Rivers, names of historic interest before the question of State rights or slavery agitated the minds of the people on the east or west shores of the Potomac River.

For all practical purposes, the seceding States may be described as bounded on the east by the Potomac; on the north, by the Cumberland Mountains [and the boundary line between the States of Kentucky and Tennessee to the Mississippi River, all west of which, as a general rule, belonged to the Confederates; and all the east and north, from the point indicated, to the Federal States: the southern boundary was the coast to the Mexican line.

The northern boundary of the Confederate States occupied very nearly the identical line for which France contended in the war of 1755-65 as part of her Canadian possessions, and very nearly succeeded in establishing her right thereto.

The adhesion of the States north of Tennessee to the Federal Government enabled it—by the admirable system of railway, traversing those States, by the advantages afforded through the courtesy of Great Britain and Canada of the free navigation of the St. Lawrence and great lakes with their connecting canals, to outflank the Confederate Territory, and to assail it at once in front, on both flanks, and in the rear, the possession of New Orleans and command of the Mississippi having separated the States east of that river from those west of it, from which the Confederate armies draw large supplies of men and subsistence and the command of the sea deprived them of any assistance on the Southern frontier. The states thus situated were Virginia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, and their value in a strategical point of view, can be best estimated from what Lieut. Colonel FLETCHER of the Scots Fusilier Guards, now Military Secretary to His Excellency the Governor General of Canada, says in his "History of the American War," page 158, vol. iii. "The trans-Mississippi department had been almost entirely cut off from the main portion of the confederacy by the result of the campaign of the preceding summer. The heart of secession was in Virginia, the Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, and in those states were to be found (strategically speaking) the true objective points.

"This fact was subsequently understood and acted upon; but as during the earlier years of the war the strength of large armies had been frittered away in the desultory warfare of partisans, so at this later period was the power of the North diverted from its proper channel to the furtherance of schemes based on political rather than military reasons."

Early in the summer of year 1864, the Federal army numbered 662,345 men under the command of General GRANT—and of this force 284,630 with lavish equipment were brought to bear against Richmond, the capital of Virginia, where General Robert S. LEE, the commander in chief of the Confederate forces, stood at bay with a total force of 81,000 men of all arms, badly found and worn out with constant marching and fighting.

The plan of operations proposed by Gen. GRANT did not display great originality of conception. The following from Colonel FLETCHER's admirable work, previously quoted, are in his own words after the contest had closed:—

"From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had which would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was completely broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops possible against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force