

ty?—No, it did not. I only felt the ship depressed, and I knew with all the guns run out on one side, she heeled over four degrees.

You have stated that in conversation with Captain Coles he said he would like to have the guns 2ft. 6in. higher. Now, the *Captain* drew that much more than she was originally designed to draw. Do you understand that he would like to have had the guns 2ft. 6in. higher than they actually were, or 2ft. 6in. higher than the original design?—I consider Captain Coles's remark to apply entirely to the ship as she then stood.

Are you able to state about what number of degrees the ship would be heeling when you observed the water to rise to the foot of the ladder leading from the deck to the bridge, as described by Captain Coles?—I am not aware that the water ever rose to the foot of the ladder, nor can I tell what would be the angle of the heel if it did so. The Court must recollect that my visit to the *Captain* was only one of several that would follow, and that I was unable when on board to obtain matters of detail which I should have obtained at a future period.

By Captain Rice: I saw the water wash against the turret. The ship was heeling and rising through an arc from 12 to 14 degrees. Probably the water on deck washing from the bow to right aft was from four to six inches deep, and it nearly swamped the cutter in which I was when leaving.

By Captain May: The state of the barometer on the morning of the 6th September was rising, and it began to fall towards six o'clock. At noon I think it was just below 30 inches—an average barometer. I first noticed the barometer fall near 11 p.m.

By Captain Commerell: My impression in looking at the *Captain* from outside when end on was that her lower yards were very square, and her masts, especially her topgallant masts, were heavy. When I went aboard her sails did not appear to me so large as I expected, and when I looked at a report made to me of the area of the sails of the ships, I was surprised to find that the area of the *Captain's* was 28,602 feet., while the *Monarch's* was 35,325 feet.

By Captain Brandreth: I was looking for a gale to try the *Captain* and the *Monarch* in from the day I left Gibraltar, with the object of carrying out the Admiral's instructions. I did not expect on the evening of the 6th that the gale would have been so sudden, but I did expect that on the following morning we should meet with the strong breeze for which I was so anxious. With regard to the question of freeboard, Captain Coles and myself had no further conversation than I have already stated.

By the President: On the night of the 6th of September the weather was not such as to cause me any anxiety whatever as to the safety of any ship of the fleet. When I left the *Captain* on the 6th to return to my flagship the former was hoisted under full topsails, jib, and driver. I am not sure about topgallant sails. She was at that time lurching, having partially fallen off, with the sea on her broadside, her gunwale at times being close down to the water. My cutter alongside was then higher than her deck, and I had to take the opportunity of jumping into the boat. As the ship rose her water fell off her decks into the boat alongside. I was in the stern walk of the flagship the greater part of the night the *Captain* foundered, and was probably there at the time, as I was watching the ships that were astern of us as well as those that were to leeward. There was a heavy squall and

a thick rain at a few minutes past midnight, which continued for about a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes. The sea was confused and cross at the time. I should have thought that Captain Burgoyne or the officer of the watch would have lowered the *Captain's* topsails in the squall, but I think the topsails would have gone before any such ship as the *Captain* would have gone over. I mean that had the *Captain* possessed the stability due to her size the topsails should have gone before she could have upset. The *Captain* would probably have been more safe under steam and without square sails, and I have reason to believe that her lee screw was going, because both Captain Burgoyne and Captain Coles told me they were constantly in the habit of using the lee screw. I have no doubt that a ship under steam alone would be capable of keeping the sea, with her bow to it, better than she could under sail. I have every inclination to give my opinion to the Court, but the *Captain* was in the hands of an able and experienced seaman. He had storm at his command to do whatever he considered best for the ship's safety. If I had been in command it is very probable I should have furled sails and used steam. But, commanded as the *Captain* was, I cannot say what were Captain Burgoyne's views and feelings on the occasion.

Will you describe to the Court to what you consider the actual foundering of the *Captain* was owing?—I think she must have heeled over beyond the angle that I saw when on board, and most probably some portion of her lee deck was under water, and at the same time she had been struck by a heavy sea to windward and thrown over. If a ship on a squally night is compelled to haul out of the line for safety under steam, and so leave the fleet or compel other ships to do the same, can she be considered fit to go to sea with a fleet?—No.

The Court at this stage was cleared for half an hour.

(To be continued.)

RUSSIA'S POSITION IN THE EAST.

In spite of the semi-official disclaimers of the *Journal de St. Petersburg*, there can be no doubt that the note of the Russian Government announcing the modification of the treaty of 1856, in regard to the closing of the Black Sea to that fleet, may be accepted as a determination to abolish the whole treaty.

Not only does the discretionary right of withdrawing in one particular, claimed by Russia, imply, as Earl Granville says in his reply, its right to withdraw in any other, but this restriction was really the only one which Russia has not in substance long ago invaded, and to her purposes, practically abolished. The cession of territory which consecrated that treaty has been more than neutralized by active Pan-Slavic propaganda in all the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey; so that not only are the population of that race, as far as Macedonia, perfectly docile to the word from St. Petersburg, but the Hellenic national feeling on which alone England and Turkey could if they were wise, have based an Anti-Slavic organization, has been utterly paralyzed by the indifference of the Western Powers to its claims and utility. To-day, by force of Slavonic schools and conspiracies in the mixed provinces, and conspiracies alone in the Danubian, the Slavonic subjects of Turkey are ready to rise at a word from the Czar, whose moral boundary is not, therefore, that of the treaty of 1856 but that of the next Slavonic insurrection.

By the same treaty Russia was bound not to construct any arsenal or fortress on the shores of the Black Sea. But while only clearing the harbour of Sebastopol of obstructions, she has completely evaded the restriction by building at Nicholaieff, on the River Bug, twenty miles from its mouth a fortress far stronger than Sebastopol, and more adapted to the new requirements of warfare, while the interval of river afford facilities for defences which makes it impregnable to naval attack. Its harbour advantages, though not naturally so great as those of Sebastopol, have been improved to a degree known to no one outside the administration connected therewith. Iron-clad gun boats have been constructed at interior arsenals, and transported piece-meal to Nicholaieff, where a fleet of them sufficient to sweep the Bosphorus and Dardanelles of all the Turkish ships, or defy all Turkish shore defences, is now ready. They are said to be of the monitor plan. So that, without having a ship or cannon mounted on the Black Sea, Russia is better prepared for a war on its waters than in the Crimean campaigns. The proffered opening of the Straits for the entry of the Turkish fleet is simply the invitation of the spider to the fly.

But the Muscovite astuteness has been no less successful in clearing away the diplomatic than the military obstacles to success. When the Cretan insurrection was fortuitously precipitated by the intrigues of the Emperor of France, it fell naturally and speedily into the hands of the Russian Government, who by its able and prescient Minister at Constantinople directed it (mainly through the American agents in Crete, Athens and Constantinople), according to Russian plans. During this insurrection the Turkish provinces in Europe, one after the other, made demonstrations of revolutionary activity which were never allowed to pass beyond control, but went far enough to secure concessions which were never contemplated by the treaty of 1856. Among others the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, though in the Russian interest and agitated by Russian agents, was, when effected, protested against by the Czar as an infraction of the treaty in question. This diplomatic romance, then inexplicable, becomes now clear—it is the pretext for the abolition of the treaty on the ground that broken agreements hold no one.

Having thus by able intrigue, and abler strategic constructions and preparations, paralyzed the Turkish administration in its European provinces, and enabled itself to pour on any point of its Turkish frontier and number of soldiers, it only remains to Russia to precipitate a collision, and with all its railways to flood European Turkey with its armies, sweep the Turkish fleet, weak, ill-provided and undisciplined from the Straits, and, if England is not prompt and provided, to seize and hold the Dardanelles against English ships from the Mediterranean.

The Russian fleet will be fitted with all the results of experience in ordnance and defence, their sailors are admirably disciplined and drilled, and Admiral Bontakoff, to whom probably the command of the fleet will fall, is an able, energetic officer, a disciplinarian of the Suwaroff type, a veteran of Sebastopol, and intimately acquainted with the Turkish forces, as well as with the English Marine. He is one of a family of Admirals, "Fighting Bontakoff," in command at Cronstadt, being his elder brother, and he enjoys the unlimited confidence of the Czar and the passionate devotion of his subordinates. Of Ignatieff, Ambassador at Constantinople, it is not necessary to speak.