

(a) reject the Indian request for inclusion of the question of Chinese representation on the agenda; and,

(b) decide not to consider during the present session new proposals to exclude the representatives of Nationalist China or accept the representatives of Communist China. Despite the acceptance of the U.S. resolution the result showed a trend unfavourable to the United States.

The Minister said that the Indian resolution might carry a procedural majority (that is, a simple majority as opposed to a two-thirds majority which was required when a matter of substance was involved). The question was whether Canada should support the resolution postponing the matter to the 14th General Assembly. While last June he might have said that the U.S. could not keep postponing this matter indefinitely, his thoughts at the moment were that this was not the time to discuss the question in view of the situation in the Taiwan Straits area. On that basis, he was in favour of Canada supporting the moratorium. Furthermore, he thought that the Canadian delegation should vote against the expected Indian amendment favouring discussion of the issue unless there were indications of a major shift in voting towards supporting the amendment. In that case, he wondered whether the delegation should be instructed to abstain, basing abstention on the proposal that Canada was willing to let other nations decide if they wanted to discuss the question while not necessarily assuming a position on the substantive issue of representation. In brief, should he vote for the moratorium and say nothing, or go on the podium and say that Canada considered that it was untimely for the General Assembly at the present session to consider the question of Chinese representation because of the existing international tension resulting from military activities in the Taiwan Straits area.

4. *During the discussion* the following points were raised:

(a) The British at the Commonwealth Economic and Trade Conference appeared very upset about the inflexible attitude of the United States concerning the Quemoy Islands, which the British did not consider as having any strategic significance. The U.S. could not withdraw now without loss of face. They were putting pressure on the British government. It was clear that, unless the situation were resolved, China's next demand would be on Hong Kong. The British were, therefore, forced to support the U.S. on Quemoy.

(b) A great part of the press in Canada appeared in favour of recognition. Mr. Holmes had reported from New York that there was a very great interest in the position which Canada would take.

(c) If, as an alternative move, Canada suggested an amendment to the resolution stressing that, under the present circumstances, it was not opportune to consider the matter, this amendment would be considered by the United States as a formal unfriendly act.

(d) In the Province of Quebec public opinion was against the United States attitude and the people did not want to see Canada get involved in a major conflict over Quemoy or Formosa. Chiang Kai-Shek was not popular in Quebec. Many of the clergy (including the clergy in the United States) considered the present situation as ridiculous. The French Ambassador had inquired from Mr. Fulton about the Roman Catholic point of view in Canada. The reasons for his inquiry appeared to be that, because of non-recognition, there was no possibility of protecting Roman Catholic missionary interests in China.

5. *The Cabinet* agreed that the Secretary of State for External Affairs vote in favour of a procedural motion postponing consideration of the issue for a fixed period such as for the duration of the 13th session of the General Assembly and that he deliver a statement in the Plenary Session along the lines proposed during the discussion.