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wise, unless we have no need of even natural sympathies against England, is the event of conflict with that Power. The unfriendly reference, however, to Powers whom it is so entirely our business to conciliate, if we mean to push things to extremity with England, is coupled with a renewal of that claim, to be the *guardians and dictators* of everything on this continent, which we once made for a special purpose, but in terms far too sweeping, so that it gave us some trouble then, and had been willingly left to slumber unrepeat until now: I allude, of course, to the famous declaration of President Monroe, now revived by Mr. Polk, to be brandished against the very nation that we have invited to treat with us, and to whom we have offered half the region in dispute. To her we are now made to say, in Mr. Monroe's words, "that no European Power shall now or henceforth be allowed to colonize any portion of the American continent." Why put forth such an assumption at such a juncture? Was it necessary to secure the American people's rights, to strengthen their title in Oregon? It is a ground so imperative and so comprehensive, that, if it has any validity, no other was to be mentioned. It puts aside all forms and sources of title, however recognised by the universal consent of nations, and rides over every thing, with the single annunciation "that we, the United States, have said it, and it shall be so." What did we mean, then, by discussing with Great Britain our rights through Gray, through Lewis and Clarke, through the purchase of Louisiana, through the Spanish cession of 1819? Why urge continuity, contiguity, or even "manifest destiny," or David's psalms or the Pope's bull? Did we condescend to discuss such petty points while we stood upon this utterly overruling one? Did we offer all beyond 49°, when *no where* on this continent is any European Power to be allowed to come? Sir, this is another remarkable instance of the unhesitating manner in which this Administration takes and shifts positions. How can men be dealt with, who enter into a discussion of claims with you, produce their titles, and then suddenly tell you of one that absolutely estops all others, but not even alluded to in the previous comparison of claims? Why had it not been stated, if it was relied upon? Why, but simply because it would not have borne to be sifted in a regular negotiation. And why was it only clapped into the message? Because, in a mere popular and party document, very bad reasons will go down, and public passions only are appealed to.

Sir, we may announce this fiat of ours as much as we please to our people, but we can never maintain it in intercourse or discussion with the other powers of the world; we never have been able to do it; for nations are compelled, if they would be respected, to confine themselves to reasonable and feasible doctrines. Can we impose this proposition on either the old world or, in spite of them, on the new world, of which this new doctrine would make us the self-appointed trustees? Originally we made the declaration in an extravagant form, but for a restricted, a practical, and a justifiable purpose—disinterestedly: for the protection of the weak against the strong; of young freedom against old despotism; of the new-formed Spanish American Republics against the threatened interference of the Holy Alliance, to help Spain resubjugate them. Of course, those States that were then to profit by it did not quarrel with its terms; but those States will no longer acquiesce in it now, when, instead of their common protection, we are threatening to become their common enemy. Europe never did and never can submit to the declaration. It is, then, if enforced, to be enforced against the entire earth. What purpose can it answer, then, but to get us into difficulties, and lower our public reputation as a people respecting the right? It never should have been made; for it never was necessary, even for the temporary and limited purpose for which it was intended. Sufficient for the day the evil and the good thereof; and a wise nation, contenting itself with providing for the one or the other, will entangle itself in its foreign policy with none of