

were of such a marginal nature as to be relatively insignificant in determining the overall capabilities of maritime forces. As evidence of several witnesses indicated, however, maritime forces are flexible to a degree and, with certain improvisation, can be used to carry out unanticipated roles to a limited extent. It is assumed that some of the roles discounted here could in fact be carried out if the need arose, albeit with less than optimum effectiveness.

6.1 Convoying

The primary objective of Canadian ASW specialization during the Second World War and in the first decade of NATO's existence was to provide protection for convoys supplying Europe. The Subcommittee has concluded that no need for convoy protection can be envisaged in any likely military eventuality.

The Department of National Defence gave evidence that as of 1958 "... it was highly unlikely that the duration of a war in Central Europe would be long enough for seaborne supply to influence the outcome." In his testimony Professor Martin noted that the concept of convoying had reached a point of minimum credibility. Dr. Lindsey's written evidence on the effect of recent strategic developments in 1956-63 on the need for protection of convoys supported this conclusion.

6.2 Limited Nuclear War at Sea

In his written evidence Dr. Lindsey raised the possible contingency of a limited nuclear war at sea. Your Subcommittee found Professor Martin's evidence particularly persuasive on this point. Department of National Defence witnesses further supported this finding, specifically, within the NATO context.

After considering the evidence of both the Department of National Defence and Professor Martin on this point, the Subcommittee conclude that limited nuclear war at sea is difficult to envisage and that Canadian maritime forces need not be equipped to meet such a danger.

6.3 Support of U.N. Peacekeeping

The provision of naval support for peacekeeping operations was suggested as a continuing requirement for Canadian maritime forces by the Department of National Defence in its written evidence.

In his evidence Professor Martin noted that it was highly unlikely that the Canadian government would agree to become involved in peacekeeping operations without broad international support. In these circumstances there would be no requirement for maritime support facilities other than possibly for transport, which could be civilian.

While the Subcommittee believes that Canada should continue to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations, it does not envisage a requirement for naval support, either to conduct shore bombardement or to provide ASW, anti-aircraft or anti-shipping protection. Canadian maritime forces have on only two occasions been used in conjunction with peacekeeping operations, in both instances providing unopposed transport facilities. The Subcommittee considers that vital and specialized roles for which Canadian maritime forces will be required should not be compromised by making special accommodation for peacekeeping support.

6.4 Surface Operations of a Military Nature in the Arctic Archipelago

The Subcommittee sees a requirement for forces capable of carrying out surveillance and for investigating and identifying military and non-military