

THE ROLE OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS¹

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Introduction

The 1981 *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)* deals with three classes of weapons. The Convention's Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons that employ wounding fragments that cannot be detected in a human body by X-rays. Protocol II restricts the use of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, booby-traps, and remote-controlled or delayed-explosive devices. Protocol III deals with limits on the use of incendiary weapons. The possible amendment of the Convention presently is being examined by a Group of Experts and a Review Conference is scheduled for 1995.

The focus of the Expert Group's considerations — and related discussions — thus far has been limited primarily to potential revisions and additions to Protocol II, with a major emphasis on anti-personnel land-mines. As a result, it is likely that the Review Conference will concentrate on three main topics:

1. Further restrictions on land-mine use, particularly obligations committing signatories to increased restraints on the use of anti-personnel mines that do not employ reliable *self-destruction and/or self-deactivation* devices and/or are not readily detectable;
2. The expansion of Protocol II to embrace, in some reasonable form, *non-international* conflicts; and
3. The inclusion of a *verification regime*, most likely only for Protocol II.