

so-called dialogue partners, an annual Post Ministerial Conference of Senior Officials to discuss security issues. As this aspect matures, ASEAN may well set the example for other subregional groups such as the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC).

Treaty-Based Organizations

There are a number of international treaties that have integral bodies with varying degrees of responsibility for implementation, verification and dispute settlement under the terms of the treaty. Others have none and depend on external and/or ad hoc support in the event of a dispute. Depending on the treaty, the scope could be global, as is generally the case for United Nations treaties, or it could be confined to a specific region.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The most important control on nuclear proliferation is the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Verification of the NPT requires a considerable degree of co-operation on the part of the Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) in providing the international verifying body (the IAEA) with detailed information regarding the operation of their declared nuclear reactors, access to nuclear installations, and the right to install unmanned sensing devices.

However, as was discovered in Iraq,¹ it is possible for a country to be in compliance at its declared sites while accumulating fissile material and designing and developing nuclear weapons at sites not declared and consequently never inspected.² As a result, confidence in the ability of IAEA safeguards to uncover activities associated with nuclear proliferation has been undermined. Moreover, new demands are being placed on the IAEA, while its resources are not being correspondingly increased. Recently, growing concern over nuclear proliferation in some newly developing countries brings into question the distribution of effort of the IAEA,

which has been directing 90 per cent of its safeguards budget into inspections of Japan, Germany and Canada.

The IAEA itself does not deal with non-compliance; rather it reports to the United Nations Security Council which is then responsible for any follow-up action.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. This document (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and opened for signature in 1967) established an organization known as OPANAL to help ensure compliance with treaty provisions. OPANAL consists of a General Conference of all states parties, a Council of five states elected by the General Conference, and a Secretariat (located in Mexico City). Non-compliance deemed a violation of the treaty is reported simultaneously to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, and to the Council of the Organization of American States. The treaty has provision for "Special Inspections" on demand. The inspections, depending on the situation, are conducted by the Secretariat or the IAEA, under the general direction of the Council.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. This is only the second such zone established in a populated area of the world. Like Tlatelolco, this treaty, signed in 1985 and also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, relies on the IAEA for verification,³ with the South Pacific Forum (a regional intergovernmental co-ordinating mechanism) as the final arbiter of disputes. The Forum can authorize special inspections with the consent of two thirds of the parties. This treaty requires 12 months' notice before any party can withdraw, thus underscoring the strong political commitment of the parties.

Partial Test Ban Treaty. This treaty, which bans all but underground nuclear explosions, whether for military or peaceful purposes, has no provisions for verification beyond the use of NTM.

¹ See John Simpson, "The Iraqi Nuclear Programme and the Future of the IAEA Safeguards System," Chapter 28 in *Verification Report 1992*, J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie, eds. (London: VERTIC, 1992), pp. 249-253.

² The NPT allows the IAEA to request special inspections of undeclared sites, but it has not been the practice to exert this right.

³ It should be noted that the Treaty of Rarotonga does not prohibit ships or aircraft of non-participating states that are carrying nuclear weapons from transiting South Pacific waters or stopping at ports or airfields in the territory of the states parties.

