

can become a critical disadvantage if all else fails and the move must be made to military enforcement action. This operational problem is ignored in much of the discussion, but it is a serious issue for the international community to address and resolve. So far, in the present crisis, it has been managed in a much more genuinely multilateral way than were similar issues in Korea, but there are still serious difficulties.

Even while the world is struggling to cope with the present crisis and the test it represents, the international machinery must now be strengthened so as to be ready the next time. Because there is an extraordinary measure of consensus among the major powers and indeed the huge majority of nations in the world, the present opportunity must be seized to strengthen the machinery in a durable way.

Some analysts argue that it would not, in fact, be wise, now or ever, to try to implement the preparatory articles (43 to 47) of the Charter's Chapter VII. Hardly ever, they suggest, will the necessary consensus prevail among the permanent members to allow the system to be used in the precise ways outlined in the Charter. Thus, to invest heavily in setting up the system now might create both excessive expectations and dangers of further serious conflict about using the system, since the great powers may once again be at odds with one another. Given adequate political will and skill, they argue, suitable constitutional authority to act can be found elsewhere in the Charter, and *ad hoc*, improvised arrangements can be made which will provide the flexibility of action which is often needed. The contrary view suggests that even if a very small minority of breaches of the peace or threats to the peace will actually provide appropriate occasions for involving this full machinery, its standing existence would in no way jeopardize any of the other instruments to which the international community can have recourse. This standing machinery would, however, ensure the wider representativeness of any Chapter VII enforcement action that might be taken, and its existence could be expected to have a healthy "deterrent" effect. It could also have the additional benefit of "confidence-building" and "early-warning", since it would involve close and regular contact among senior military commanders of the permanent members and others.

But we must be careful not to overload the system of multilateral order-building in its relative infancy; moderate and realistic expectations are needed as to how many conflicts the international community and fragile international institutions can handle.