

(Mr. Králík Czechoslovakia)

initiative we were talking about last year. As an example, the Conference could possibly initiate a joint declaration by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament and those having observer status, undertaking not to be the first to use chemical weapons during the period of negotiations on the CWC.

I would like to devote my statement today to questions concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons (CW) and the finalization of the chemical weapons convention (CWC). In recent years, the Ad Hoc Committee on CW has moved toward completion of the CWC. However, there are certain open questions to be solved, some of them of a technical nature and some of a political character. In respect of both - political and technical - different working papers have been distributed dealing with various aspects of the future CWC. In the interests of openness and - if possible - obtaining more information from the States parties to the future CWC, the majority of delegations, including Czechoslovakia (in document CD/949) have presented working papers about their chemical potential. However, with a view to the future development of the "rolling text", a more detailed assessment of the needs of inspectors and financial aspects, and clarification of some technical questions, in my last statement in August 1990 our delegation announced a new document. The document contains very detailed data on Czechoslovakia's chemical potential, including not only qualitative but also quantitative data on the production, processing, consumption, export and import of chemicals falling under the scope of the future CWC. This document, numbered CD/1048, has just been distributed.

Let me say a few words about the philosophy of our approach. As stated in the past, and I can repeat it once again, Czechoslovakia has no CW. Our country also intends, and this is well known, to be an original party to the CWC. That is why we approach the CWC very seriously. Today I wish to inform you that we synthesize compounds on schedule 1, as you can see from the document distributed, of course in much smaller quantities than those permitted by the proposals contained in the present "rolling text".

In a spirit of good will and on a voluntary basis, we also declare and specify the facilities, including their owners and locations. We believe that after this declaration there will be a clearer picture of the verification requirements of the future CWC in one country. We hope for similar openness from other States because these data, taken together, are connected with personnel, equipment and other needs for implementation of the CWC. Let me inform distinguished delegations that these data can also be verified in a very simple way. Last year, bilateral talks were held between the United States Embassy in Prague and our Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and on 17 December 1990 - on the basis of an agreement - United States specialists visited a Czechoslovak military facility in Slovakia used for synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals. As a result of this visit it was confirmed that the schedule 1 chemicals produced cannot be considered to be CW. For the same purpose, the commander of the facility authorized the use of a computerized data base to review the production of chemicals in a year selected at random from a 10-year period. The professionalism of the facility and its workers were appreciated. This high level of professionalism of Czechoslovak scientists can be documented now on the basis of the activities of a small but qualified group of military specialists in the Gulf.