

this central premise about the nature of the ACD process, there were substantive differences between the two.

In 1987, Ambassador Roche identified compliance with existing ACD agreements and "maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime" as principal concerns. Canada's specific areas of interests were those resolutions relating to verification, chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), and Canada's own "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes" (FIZZ).

In contrast, Ambassador Fortier focused on the contribution the UN could make to the ACD process, especially that which the First Committee could make through its consideration of ACD resolutions. As in 1987, Canada was most interested in those resolutions that dealt with verification, chemical weapons, and a CTBT. However, Ambassador Fortier also made special reference to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; this had been omitted in 1987. Furthermore, he added that Canada was "eager to engage with other delegations in constructive and dispassionate dialogue on how best to bring the conventional arms race, in both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, under more effective control."

It would be inappropriate to draw from the above that Canada was uninterested in these latter issues at the 1987 session of the UNGA. Reference has been made to them in previous presentations to the First Committee. Rather, the conclusion one ought to make is that in the prevailing circumstances of 1988, Canada felt it necessary to call international attention to them once again in the hope that efforts in these areas would not be allowed to slip in the wake of greater attention being given to more high profile issues.

Ambassador Fortier's address also signalled Canada's intention to be active in the First Committee's 1988 deliberations in an effort to limit ideological rhetoric by cautioning patience, persistence, realism, and compromise. In this regard, Canada reinforced its traditional role in global affairs: quiet middle-power diplomacy. While Canada's policy on ACD issues would be creative within the confines of this traditional approach, it was highly unlikely that Canada would boldly step outside the bounds of this tradition. This approach suggested that, in the main, the superpowers would set the principal terms of reference in the ACD field upon which the rest of the world could then build.