

majority in the Security Council. They had the same kind of veto in effect, if they acted together, that the permanent members had. That produced a totally different ball game. We had to work really hard and maneuver with the Third World representatives to get nine favourable votes, even to get something on the Council's agenda, let alone to get any resolution through.

"And how difficult it was to arrive at the magic figure of nine! I discovered this when Canada took the initiative with Denmark in May 1967 to have the Security Council cope with the threat of hostilities in the Middle East just before the outbreak of the Six-Day War. On May 16, Egypt had demanded the removal of the troops of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] from buffer zone points east of Suez. It was a move intended to support Syria, which feared a full-scale attack from Israel, by taking over positions at Sharm al-Sheikh that commanded the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

"When UNEF was thrown out, on the face of it, logically and objectively, you would think the Security Council would meet promptly, as it was intended to do under the UN Charter, or else that the General Assembly would be brought into special session under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, and it would be recognized that certain consequences should be prevented, possibly including hostilities. I argued this with Secretary-General U Thant at a private meeting of states contributing to UNEF; I argued this in the Security Council on May 24, when Hans Tabor and I succeeded in getting a day's debate which ended without a vote on our resolution. But no! The Afro-Asians stood behind Egypt and were determined (as they said) 'to teach Israel and the Americans a lesson.'

"Not until after Israel had won this war in June with all the military aid the Americans gave them and had suddenly turned the tables on its opponents, did attitudes change. Then we were back in a situation where co-operation was suddenly restored. Syria and the Soviet Union called for an urgent meeting of the Council at a special night session, which promptly and unanimously accepted a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire.

"This really leads to the issues which I think caused Pierre Trudeau's disillusionment with the UN. The Soviets and the French were more obstructive of peacekeeping operations than they are now; they had refused to pay any share of the UN Congo operations. What I was faced with when I took over as ambassador in 1966 was a resolution that had been cooked up by the Department of External Affairs, which would require a fraction of the contributions of member states to the UN's regular budget—about two or three per cent—to be assigned to peacekeeping. The Soviets were opposing this resolution, which would go through the General Assembly process, and the Indians were representing the Afro-Asians in opposition.

"This subject became one of the reasons why, I surmise, Trudeau went sour on the United Nations. He was sent down by Pearson (whose Parliamentary Secretary he was in 1966) to work with me, and I asked him to represent Canada on the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly; and this whole question and the Canadian resolution was referred to this committee [on which every member state has representation]. Through caucusing with the Latin American group, who nearly always worked with us, we managed to get