

delegation, in advocating an international exchange of seismic data, expressed itself in favour of the creation of international machinery and linked this exchange of seismic data with its proposal (ENDC/232) for the creation of a committee which would have also the right to carry out inspections (ENDC/PV.404, paras.12 et seq.).

105. The Soviet Union considers that the development of modern science and technology has reached a level which makes it possible to exercise control through the use of national means over the fulfilment of an agreement banning underground tests. Control would give all States the assurance that the agreement in question was being conscientiously carried out. Of course, if one is anxious to continue underground nuclear tests, one can clutter the way to an agreement with a great number of artificial obstacles, including those of a scientific and technical character, in order to justify one's negative attitude. The history of the many years of negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests provides us with numerous examples of the way in which those who wanted to delay the solution of the problem of tests have acted at times precisely in this direction. If, on the contrary, States have the firm desire and determination to put an end, once and for all, to dangerous nuclear weapon tests underground, then all the possibilities exist for concluding an appropriate international agreement and for its subsequent implementation.

106. We are convinced that none of the nuclear Powers will venture to violate the agreement banning underground nuclear tests when national means of detection are used for control over the implementation of that agreement. In the conditions where dozens of States possess sensitive seismic equipment capable of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions over great distances, there is too great a risk that a violation of the agreement would be discovered. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready without delay to sign an agreement banning nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection, and strictly to abide by the agreement.

107. Certain delegations have put forward here in the Committee various proposals for a partial solution of the problem of banning underground nuclear tests which, in short, come to the following: that the more powerful underground nuclear weapons up to a certain threshold should be banned, and that the rest of the underground tests should be banned on the basis of an additional agreement. A proposal of that nature was put forward, in particular, as the members of the Committee are aware, by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/144, p.33) which proposed the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests above the threshold of a magnitude of 4.75, with the establishment by the nuclear Powers of a moratorium on underground weapons tests below that threshold. We should like to stress that the Soviet side gives its assent to this proposal of the United Arab Republic in the interests of reaching an agreement as quickly as possible, although we are convinced that all underground nuclear explosions, including explosions with a magnitude below the threshold of 4.75, can be detected with national seismic means.

108. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation the achievement of an agreement on underground tests depends upon a political decision of the Governments of the nuclear Powers. The demand for the solution of the problem of banning underground nuclear tests on the basis of on-site inspection not only does not help towards concluding an agreement in regard to the problem but, on the contrary, blocks its solution.

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21.8.69

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29. At this stage my delegation has no intention of giving a detailed analysis of this document. However, proceeding from our well-known position on the question of control over the implementation of a comprehensive test ban, I should like to comment briefly