them by an unsuccessful defendant, pending proceedings for their recovery, had no foundation in common law. He adds:

Any such doctrine would, if logically carried out, practically greatly embarrass ordinary trade, and be, to say the least, highly inconvenient to every one except plaintiffs claiming goods. If the doctrine of *lis pendens* were applicable to personal property generally, bankers and others could not safely make advances on ships or goods and that which represents them in commerce—*e.g.*, bills of lading, dock warrants, wharfinger's receipts, nor upon stock and share certificates, nor upon debentures or policies, nor even on negotiable securities, without making searches in the Judgment Registry Office. Such a doctrine would paralyze the trade of the country, and there is no warrant for it either in the statutes relating to *lis pendens* or in the decisions of the courts. The first statute on the subject is 2 & 3 Victoria, c. 11, s. 7. The language of this statute shows that the Legislature was dealing with "estates"—*i.e.*, land and land only. ** Again, reliance was placed on the practice of conveyancers who advise purchasers and mortgagees of personal estate to search the *lis pendens* registry. This is intelligible and reasonable enough. Conveyancers advise on abstracts of title and always try and keep their clients out of difficulties and possible litigation. If an abstract of title to personalty is laid before a conveyancer, he naturally advises an intending purchaser or mortgagee to make such inquiries as experience shows to be prudent in order to avoid trouble and vexation in the future. There is no case in the books which warrants the notion that the doctrine of *lis pendens* applies to personal property other than leasehold property. * * *

Upon principle and authority I am of opinion that the doctrine in question is inapplicable to personal property other than chattel interests in land. The inconvenience of extending the doctrine to ordinary personal property is so extremely serious, that it would, in my opinion, be very wrong so to extend it now for the first time, even if such extension could be justified by reasoning from well-established general propositions which might serve as premisses for arriving at such a conclusion.

But then it is said that in this case there was not only a registered *lis pendens*, but an injunction and a receiver. But of these the present appellants had no notice whatever when they advanced their money and obtained and perfected their security. Their title is in no way affected by those orders, nor have the appellants, the bank, been guilty of any contempt of court. The case would have been different if the bank had had notice of the order appointing the receiver or granting the injunction, or even if the receiver had given notice to the debtors to pay