

Book Reviews

attitudes towards Japan during the war and early post-war years."

Following the Japanese surrender on September 3, 1945, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ, SCAP) asked the Canadian Government to second Norman to serve as the civilian head of a US Counter-Intelligence Unit in Japan. He stayed until January 1946; then spent seven months in Washington as Deputy Canadian Representative on the eleven-power Far Eastern Commission (F.E.C.) responsible for the formulation of Allied policy for occupied Japan. In July 1946 he went back to Japan as Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission. There he looked after Canadian interests and made thoughtful suggestions for Canadian positions on occupation policies to be advanced in the F.E.C. in Washington. The book under review would have been improved if it had taken into account, even in editorial interpolation, Professor Michael Fry's 1982 paper on *The Occupation of Japan: The MacArthur-Norman Years* and my own 1983 paper on *Canadian Views of United States' Policy Toward Japan 1941-52*. Both of these papers discuss Norman's contributions to Canadian views on occupation policies and also directly on the implementation of F.E.C. directives by SCAP in Japan.

Norman's influence was greatest during the early democratization period in Japan. By the time the Cold War became pronounced after the Soviet take-over of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and the Chinese Communists were gaining the upper hand in the civil war, many began to regard Japan more as a forward defence post in the Western Pacific than a defeated enemy to be controlled. When North Korea attacked the South in June 1950 Japan became the essential rear base of the United Nations Forces sent to Korea to assist in repelling aggression. When Norman was recalled to Ottawa in October 1950 for a security review in connection with charges raised in the U.S. Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee, he had already served over four years on this assignment. The winding down of the occupation, and the major new concern with Canada's role in the Korean conflict would have provided less scope for Norman's historical knowledge of Japan.

After serving as Head of the American and Far Eastern Division from 1950-53, Norman was posted as High Commissioner to New Zealand. I believe it was a mark of Lester Pearson's admiration for the socio-economic analytical abilities demonstrated by Norman in his studies on Japan that he named him early in 1956 to be Ambassador to Egypt where he could refocus his analysis on the new movement of Arab socialism led by President Nasser.

No one could have predicted that the Suez crisis would break out just two months after Norman's arrival in August 1956, that British and French forces would invade to preserve the *status quo* of the Suez Canal Treaty regime, that Pearson would play such a prominent role at the United Nations in sponsoring the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to end the confrontation, that Norman would be called upon to play such an active role in persuading President Nasser to accept Canadian forces as a leading element in UNEF, and that in the midst of all this the US Internal Security Sub-Committee should renew its allegations against Norman, ignoring the results of the security

clearance by the R.C.M.P in December 1950. It is a tragedy that Norman should have found these pressures intolerable and taken his own life on April, 4, 1957.

Part Two of the volume contains five essays on Norman's scholarship, his methods of analysing Japanese history and his influence on Japanese and American historians. These are of special interest to experts in Japanese history.

Reischauer says "his role in re-establishing intellectual contact between Japanese historians and the outside world was a significant service. "From the moment of his post-war return to Japan in October 1945, he treated Japanese scholars as old friends and intellectual equals. Maruyama Masao observes that "he was a historian of the world before he was a historian of Japan . . . He could hold a room in rapt attention with a rich profusion of historical anecdotes. Japanese were impressed by the breadth of his analyses, cross-cultural comparisons, and his empathy with critical insight into Japanese society. Others remarked on his enjoyment of cultural pursuits, his aestheticism, and the beauty of his prose.

During and after the war many young Americans took up Japanese studies, and it was natural that they would try to go beyond Norman's pioneer analysis. At the 1968 convention of the Association for Asian Studies, Professor Yamamura Kozo criticized Norman as an economic historian, apparently because he had failed to foresee questions that would arise 30 years after his study was written. Then in 1975, Professor George Akita of the University of Hawaii asserted that "Norman did not employ primary sources, that he was reliant on secondary sources in English (rather than Japanese), that his work lacked originality, and that he worked hastily and distorted sources." His criticisms were refuted by other American scholars, saying they focused on the minutiae of footnotes.

An ideological factor was also introduced into the debate, as to whether Norman followed the leftist materialistic determination or the socio-economic school of historians. The eminent Japanese historian, Professor Toyama Shigeki, comments that "Historical materialism tries to demonstrate that class struggle and socialist revolution are the inevitable results of the economic factor in history. However, by making his frame of reference the development of capitalism and modernization, Norman tried to indicate his confidence in the advance of freedom and progress towards democracy."

The editor's inclusion in Part Three of three speeches and an essay by Norman broadly on the subject of man's search for individual freedom in a democratic society, was, I assume, intended to support his concluding comment. "At the very time Norman was accused of being a communist he was expounding on the virtues of liberal persuasion, free speech, and human reason . . . Had more careful attention been given to his public pronouncements, his enemies would have better understood Norman's passion for freedom and democracy."

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