

To take the external first. Europe had run its takeoff, joining Dr. Kissinger's triangle, at a time when the configurations of power in the world were already changing. The changes affected both East-West relations and North-South relations.

to see terms of East-West relations, the emerging entity of Western Europe was read for to find that its room for manoeuvre had been decreased rather than increased by the progress of *détente* and the success of the German Government as a *Ostpolitik*. The latter had been conceived of by the German Government as the beginning of a process – what Willy Brandt called a “dynamic status”. In other words, it was expected to humanize and normalize the relations between the two halves of Europe. It was conceived of by the Russians as the end of a process: that is, it would normalize relations. And the limits of normalization were rapidly shown by the widespread application of the doctrine of *Abgrenzung*.

dynamic status quo was reduced to a static status quo. And this in turn was made possible by the fact that *détente* (so far as it was ever a reality) consisted much more of a special super-power understanding than of a general East-West understanding. Nothing showed this more clearly than the preparations for the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. West Germany had hoped at one stage to create a connection (*sachlicher Zusammenhang*) between the three "baskets" which not necessarily a direct linkage (*Verknüpfung*) between the three "baskets" of negotiation. In such a view, economic concessions by the West to the East would have been seen to be clearly related to — and not necessarily conditional upon —

Such a strategy appeared for a time to unite The Nine. Indeed, it was perhaps the first united foray of the nine members into the field of foreign-policy making. It is hard to say whether, in any event, it would have succeeded. No matter — it made the Soviet Union uncomfortable in Geneva and brought the United States into a position where, for the sake of further progress at SALT and in the MBFR talks, it helped to rescue the Soviet Union from its discomfort and to wind up the Helsinki Conference as quickly as possible. And since that time *détente* itself has, in any case, come increasingly into question. Western Europe was disappointed with the results of *détente* while it was still flourishing; when, instead, it began to show the fissiparous tendencies of super-power competition, Europeans also competed. The expectations that commercial policy would provide the basis for a foreign policy gave way instead to separate accommodations by the various European governments with Moscow.

Threefold changes

*Europeans
make separate
accommodations
with Moscow*