in contemporary pressures among members of the EEC; the nature these pressures will be examined a little er. But first, in order to understand m, some clarification — even of a cury nature — of the frustration suffered ween 1973 and 1976 is worth while empting. Obviously, these frustrations we both an internal and an external iracter.

To take the external first. Europe had un its takeoff, joining Dr. Kissinger's tangle, at a time when the configurates of power in the world were already "peninging. The changes affected both East-reality at relations and North-South relations.

## can dol**ects of détente**

to see terms of East-West relations, ry amerging entity of Western Europe was ead for to find that its room for manoeuvre the fibeen decreased rather than increased ic dithe progress of détente and the success am (in stpolitik. The latter had been congative ed of by the German Government as In other beginning of a process — what Willy acquirendt called a "dynamic status". In other elationds, it was expected to humanize and appearalize the relations between the two ween Emanies and the two halves of Europe. Commit it was conceived of by the Russians as ers merend of a process: that is, it would pected ely normalize relations. And the limits w initialormalization were rapidly shown by Union widespread application of the doctrine This, bgrenzung.

ed Eur This East German formulation of a ginning mique whereby economic relations do ome inspill over into political relations, which ements un do not spill over into cultural rela-Nine ars, which themselves leave human renow subins to be organized as part of a political ission. (aining process - this technique and o becom doctrine soon became characteristic only of the East German approach to ions with the West but of the attitude ost other East European states as well. rope app dynamic status quo was reduced to a off". And this in turn was made has been ble by the fact that détente (so far as s ever a reality) consisted much more to sugg special super-power understanding in a general East-West understanding. been si Nothing showed this more clearly can stithe preparations for the Final Act ie Helsinki Conference. West Gerhad hoped at one stage to create a emember [ lisappear h not necessarily a direct linkage t faire ktum between the three "baskets" gotiation. In such a view, economic anyone been seen to be clearly related to—which not necessarily conditional uponsecurity agreements, in which, of course, some of the major concessions would have been made by the East to the West. Similarly, any long-term commercial or economic agreement would have been tied to the observance of the humanitarian and intellectual provisions of "Basket Three".

Such a strategy appeared for a time to unite The Nine. Indeed, it was perhaps the first united foray of the nine members into the field of foreign-policy making. It is hard to say whether, in any event, it would have succeeded. No matter - it made the Soviet Union uncomfortable in Geneva and brought the United States into a position where, for the sake of further progress at SALT and in the MBFR talks, it helped to rescue the Soviet Union from its discomfort and to wind up the Helsinki Conference as quickly as possible. And since that time détente itself has, in any case, come increasingly into question. Western Europe was disappointed with the results of détente while it was still flourishing; when, instead, it began to show the fissiparous tendencies of super-power competition, Europeans also competed. The expectations that commercial policy would provide the basis for a foreign policy gave way instead to separate accommodations by the various European governments with Moscow.

The British, the French and the Germans have all competed to supply Moscow with credits to buy from them, and so provide employment at home. In one sense, at least, Solzhenitsyn seems to be right: instead of using their economic strength as a bargaining counter to reach security agreements, the West Europeans continued to subsidize a Soviet peace economy, which in turn enabled the Soviet Government to maintain a war economy. The fruits of détente are, therefore, at best uncertain and divisive. But this pattern also reflects something of the economic weakness of Western Europe – and this weakness derives from North-South relations rather than East-West relations.

## Threefold changes

Within a year of the enlargement of the Community, the rise in oil prices, already evident at the beginning of 1973, was about to undergo its dramatic quadruple leap. The changes of 1974 were threefold. First, they bitterly divided Europeans and Americans. The disputes between the United States and the EEC countries arose out of the question of rendering assistance to Israel during the war of October 1973, but they also extended to the question of whether one should confront or accommodate the oil-producing nations. To the extent

Europeans make separate accommodations with Moscow