

Supply—National Defence

squadrons, as the house knows, or at least those members of it who follow this subject, have the role of interdiction or striking with nuclear or conventional capacity well behind the lines of any conflict that might develop in Europe.

● (3:00 p.m.)

These tactical nuclear weapons are in theory under the control of the United States political administration but it has been revealed recently—I do not know whether I have the clipping from the *New York Times* here—that the warheads, that are in what is supposed to be American custody and in theory cannot be used without the specific approval of the United States, are in fact mounted on allied weapons systems and are inadequately controlled. This is the view of the people in the American administration.

The danger constituted by the existence of these air squadrons is that they are highly vulnerable. We were told in the defence committee that Russian rockets are trained on them. I ask the house to consider seriously the danger that in a moment of tension the military incentive, the almost overwhelming military incentive on either side to take action before their own air squadrons on the one side or their rockets on the other were destroyed. The need to anticipate even in a matter of seconds the action that may be taken on the other side would be intense.

A little while ago the Right Hon. Fred Mulley, who is the British Minister of Defence for the Army, wrote an article for the Institute of Strategic Studies. This article was published in "Survival". I invite the attention of the committee to these words of a man who is daily concerned with these problems. He said that the greatest danger of nuclear war comes from the risks of nuclear escalation and it is unfortunate that our preoccupation with the less relevant issue of strategic nuclear policy has prevented discussion of what seems to Mr. Mulley the real question facing NATO, the role and command of tactical nuclear forces.

We do not get a word from the minister here about what Mr. Mulley tells us is the chief issue. We are not even distracted by discussions of strategic nuclear control; we are left with discussions of integration at headquarters. Mr. Mulley goes on to point out that the allied air forces in Europe may fit into the concept of a generalized nuclear war, but he says they do not match the political requirements of avoiding nuclear escalation

and the attempt to compel a pause in a limited war situation. This constitutes in fact, whether we choose to realize it or not, as Mr. Mulley says, the major danger of a nuclear war; yet we maintain our role in this connection and the minister does not choose to even discuss it with the house.

The minister, so far as his statements and the White Paper reveal, is totally unconcerned by this vital problem. So far as we can tell, he commits Canada to a continuation of this role. I must say that in the White Paper it is indicated that the CF-104 aircraft would not be required in the future and that the numbers of operational squadrons will decline as the result of normal wasting away over the next 10 years.

The minister tells us nothing as to whether Canada proposes to accept in NATO some alternative role or replacement of these aircraft or whether, as the CF-104 has become non-operational, the Canadian air contribution will just fade away. The whole concept of our contribution to the tactical nuclear air force in Europe was described by John Gellner to the committee—and I think I have his words right—as a \$500 million blunder. It is typical of this government and this minister—

Mr. Herridge: I have been saying that for five years.

Mr. Brewin: —that we are to continue the operation of this blunder until, in the language of the minister, it is phased out. It is typical of the minister that he can make a statement on defence without comment on these vital issues.

There remain the antisubmarine role and the active defences under NATO. That the first constituted a massive contribution to fighting the last two world wars and will probably have no relevance to any imaginable war in the missile age does not seem to have attracted the interest of the minister at all; nor does, obviously, the obsolete nature of our active air defence under NORAD provoke any reaction in the minister except vague hints that the Bomarc squadrons will be gradually phased out as the relative threat of the manned bomber diminishes.

The plain fact of the matter is that the threat caused by the manned bomber no longer exists and defence against it is useless. This brings me to the last role to be mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the so-called Mobile Command. I say it is good news to hear from the minister that this special service force