

NATO—European Defence Community

victories in this field. I think the west should also be prepared to counter Soviet offers in a positive way and not spend too much effort on pointing out the hollowness and the insincerity of those offers.

To most Germans the desire for unification goes extremely deep, and it is a desire that is going to be achieved by one means or another. But I believe that more and more Germans will realize that a neutral Germany would be in grave danger of becoming an enlarged East Germany, and that their best hope for an eventual peaceful unification of their country lies in the integration of the federal republic and ultimately of all Germany with the western defence system. This grave step, however—and it is a grave step—may seem to many observers to involve risks and to involve also the protracted division of Germany. There is no doubt that in lining up behind this policy we are taking a calculated risk, to use that somewhat shopworn but still serviceable phrase.

What are the alternatives to it? Should we suspend any consideration of Germany's association with the west? Should we suspend such things as the European defence treaty and this peace contract until a scheme for unification and a peace treaty has been worked out with the Russians and their friends, on the basis they have put forward, which includes a national German army, the pardoning of all nazis, and German neutrality, with all foreign troops withdrawn—the Russian troops presumably to Poland and at least some of the western troops presumably across the Atlantic. Should we support that proposal as an alternative to the proposals which we have before us today? That alternative has commanded some support in circles which are certainly not allied with communism. Quite apart from the danger of a neutral Germany, with complete control of its own forces and rearming in its own way without restriction, and quite apart from the danger of that kind of Germany working with the east, if we followed that course it would also wreck the patient and intelligent work of the North Atlantic countries and the Adenauer government, and it would lay Germany open to uncertainty, confusion and, I suggest, danger.

The policy now proposed frees Germany but includes her in the European system. Her rearmament will be defensive and international; and I hope that both this defensive and this international character of German rearmament will be stressed. I hope also that our policy of rearmament within the European defence community will not be taken to mean that we are going to be inflexible in our approach to the larger and ultimate problem of a unified Germany with a peace treaty

[Mr. Pearson.]

to which the U.S.S.R. must subscribe, because inflexibility and negotiation in matters of this kind are incompatible. The western aim has been—and should, I suggest, continue to be—a slackening of world tension followed by a reasoned, calm and firm endeavour to end the cold war. Our hope remains, as it must, that eventually we may enter upon an era of peace for which men everywhere so ardently long; and they include millions of men in the Soviet union itself.

The agreements signed at Bonn and Paris and the western replies to the Soviet notes have shown the Soviet union that the period of fear is over and that the west now stands firm against the encroachments of the police state.

There will be difficulties ahead, especially during the period when ratification is being discussed. But it should not be beyond the capacity of western statesmen to overcome those difficulties. I believe that there is now a real prospect of European integration not merely on a continental basis but within the developing North Atlantic community—a community which is not designed to be exclusive in character or to replace the United Nations but rather to ensure that the magnificent vision of the United Nations is not destroyed from within.

I am not blind—nor do I think any of us are—to the danger of a restored and a rearmed Germany, but I believe that within the European defence community this restoration and this rearmament can be brought to serve not the ends of totalitarian aggression—which it has served in the past—but the ends of peace in Europe and in the world. It is in that hope, Mr. Speaker, that I submit for the approval of this house the North Atlantic treaty protocol which is before us.

Mr. Gordon Graydon (Peel): Mr. Speaker, with what the minister said a few moments ago with respect to the vital importance of the debate in which we are now engaged I am in entire agreement. There have been few issues with which this parliament has had to deal which have required as much study and have given as much anxiety and concern as has this problem of our ratification of the present NATO protocol. It is proper that Canadians should give every possible consideration and study to this matter. In a sense we are at a turning point in history because these agreements, which are of such a complicated and multiple character, have an important bearing upon what happens not only in Europe but in other parts of the world in the days that lie ahead.

I must say that as I am speaking now I have a feeling of heavier responsibility with respect to the position taken in connection with this protocol than I have had on almost