countries in defining new targets and strategies. This is no justification for complacency, however. Indeed, Canada must make more fundamental changes than the other countries to catch up in the technological race. Moreover, while the approach we suggest is probably the only realistic one, it will necessarily be time consuming to carry out and will therefore take several years to produce its full benefits. This is why we consider the 1970s a transitional period.

But Canada has already reached the crossroads. Choices must be made \times now. Major decisions cannot be delayed. This nation may choose to maintain its passive attitude toward emerging world trends, let the secondary manufacturing sector of its economy gradually deteriorate, and rely mainly on the rapid depletion of its resources and its impact on services to sustain its growth. In the short term, this is the easy way, although the growing pains of manufacturing industries will be felt in the reduction in job opportunities and in a lower standard of living. In the long run, however, that choice will almost inevitably lead to an economic dead end that only annexation to the United States could delay.

The other alternative is for this country to assume the responsibility for its own destiny; to become innovative in order to strengthen its manufacturing industries; to economize and use its resources more rationally during the latter part of the century; and thus to maintain a more balanced, stable, and independent economy in the future. This may be a hard choice to make in the short term because it will require a radical change in Canadian traditions and attitudes, a major industrial conversion, which will leave temporary but significant adverse side-effects, and deep re-adjustments in the orientation and role of many private and public institutions. But in the long run, such a choice is the only rational one Canada can make.

The most crucial question is whether Canadians and their leaders now have the will to launch this new collective venture successfully. Are they prepared to put aside their vested interests, their ethnic and regional differences, their favourite ideologies, their present affluence and security, to reach a practical consensus on the shape of their future and to sustain the effort and the sacrifice that will be required to attain the objectives of the Canadian innovation operation?

This second and more difficult choice is still available. But time is running short. The 1980s may be too late to begin the operation. By then, failing the major national decisions that are required now, Canada's future will very likely have been committed to an irreversibly wrong course by default.

We intend to deal with the second generation of science policy in a subsequent volume. This covers social R&D and social innovations and is