

13 CONCLUSION

A major theme of this report, is that peace-keeping capacity within the UN is alive and well. This is particularly true for the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

DPKO has undergone rapid growth in size and capacity, and all indications are that this capacity will continue to grow even if staff resources do not. There is a high degree of professionalism and self-motivation with individuals moving to address perceived gaps and past failures. Much of DPKO is perfectly justified in maintaining that they know what needs to be done in peace-keeping, and can do most of it if only they are given sufficient resources and assistance. Also as reflected in the report, there are a number of other parts of the UN involved with peace-keeping that have the same attitude as DPKO. They are working effectively alongside DPKO to enhance UN peace-keeping capacity. There are also some glaring shortcomings by parts of the UN.

The capacity to respond quickly in the face of the unforeseen remains a premium in peace-keeping generally and rapid reaction particularly. There are a group of impediments to this rapid reaction that require substantial improvements, but appear to be imminently resolvable from within the UN. Such issues include standby troop and unit preparedness through sufficient and common training, the use of standard operational procedures, and the application of general operational plans that can be pulled out and quickly adapted.

It is largely accepted that "The Organization should be ready to field small missions within 48 hours of legislative authorization; start-up times to achieve operational self-sufficiency in general should be no more than 10 days to a month for a small mission (e.g. up to 500 personnel), two to three months for a medium-sized mission (e.g. up to 5,000 personnel) and four to five months for a large mission (e.g. above 5,000 personnel)." ⁵⁸ Quite clearly the UN is not yet capable of this degree of limited rapid reaction, but arguably will be with time. However, larger rapid reaction operations are far beyond the present capacity of the UN. There are some real doubts as to the ability of the UN to achieve this larger rapid reaction capacity in the short or medium term.

These doubts arise because there are some major impediments to rapid reaction that appear inherent to

⁵⁸ para 4, A/48/945 25 May 1994 ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, *Effective planning, budgeting and administration of peace-keeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General*