

reject, the evolution of intelligence and security organizations into untraditional areas. This said, an effective national mechanism, even coordination by existing institutions within existing mandates, is needed to develop coherent policy.

The national security linkage is not a classic case of environmental spillovers, where one or a number of countries' actions affect the environment of other countries. The ability of environmental stress to generate or add to violent conflict adds a new dimension to thinking on the use of unilateral extrajurisdictional trade measures. Canada and many other countries oppose the use of unilateral extrajurisdictional trade measures. The basis of this position is that an individual country has the right to set environmental standards within its domestic jurisdiction. Collectively, countries may agree to environmental policies or practices within international environmental agreements. Allowing foreign countries to dictate domestic environmental practices, with the threat of trade sanctions to enforce the foreign country's view, is unlikely to be in Canada's best interest. Unilateral trade action that places an economic penalty on a foreign country is likely to add to economic/social hardships, and add to negative developments arising from the environmental stress. For global or transboundary environmental problems, the best approach is through international cooperation, not power politics. This position has traditionally been based on environmental degradation as a discrete policy concern. The ability of environmental stress to contribute to violence raises the stakes further and reinforces the need for international cooperation and solutions.

The linkage also suggests that the governments of developing countries will need to reassess the importance of the environment in broad terms for their countries. It has been suggested that developing countries may consider that the developed countries are the "demandeurs" on the environment file, and that this gives the developing countries some bargaining leverage.⁴⁸ With this logic, certain developing countries may hold the view that, if the developed countries want a clean environment, then the latter should pay for it, while all countries would to some extent benefit. The environmental stress-national security linkage weakens this argument. With the prospect of conflict and possible political instability, developing countries may see that their direct contribution to the maintenance of a clean environment must have a higher priority.

⁴⁸Richard N. Cooper, Environment and Resource Policies for the World Economy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1994, p. 57.