

3. National Intelligence Means (NIM), particularly HUMINT — the intelligence supplied by humans — will become a key element in monitoring future multilateral agreements. Collateral analysis of open sources, for example, media reports, will also make an important contribution.
4. Incentives to cheat and the costs of cheating will continue to be important in the analysis of verification regimes for agreements constraining proliferation. Crisis stability is enhanced when neither party has strong incentives to launch a first strike. Understanding the underlying motives may lead to measures beyond arms control which lessen the tensions leading to the development of clandestine weapons programs. Increasing the costs of cheating buys time for proliferation initiatives to work.
5. The question, “after non-compliance, what?” will need to be revisited. Enforcement of stiff international sanctions will be the most appropriate response, and this will need to involve the UN Security Council or other respected international bodies.
6. The role of the UN Security Council in providing security guarantees and meting out and enforcing sanctions will need to be strengthened.
7. A greater emphasis on regional and local arms control and confidence-building measures will produce a need to train and advise local parties in the use of verification methods such as on-site inspections and the collection and analysis of readily available open source data.
8. The lessons learned from the UNSCOM experiences in Iraq will constitute a two-edged sword. They will be valuable in designing future verification regimes for agreements designed to halt or at least slow the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. However, these same lessons will be used by proliferators, such as North Korea, to

tolerate inspections without revealing the true nature and scope of their illegal programs. “Red teaming” — role playing in which teams assume the parts of the other side — inspections might prove a useful exercise.

Assumptions About Future Verification Methods and Techniques

1. National technical means (NTM) will remain the foundation for verifying all types of bilateral arms control agreements involving the United States and Russia.
2. There will be increased pressures on the United States, Russia, and other developed countries to share data from NTM, and there will be more efforts to develop international technical means (ITM) or regional technical means for purposes of verifying multilateral agreements.
3. Many Third World countries will have to rely solely on their NIM — their overall national intelligence means — in lieu of reliance on advanced satellite and other technical collection systems. If they feel that their national interests are at stake, they may exert pressure for an international body to perform on-site inspections, perform overhead surveillance, or carry out other verification tasks.
4. Data exchanges and notifications will make significant contributions to the verification of future agreements because they provide baseline information, much of which can be confirmed, because they promote transparency, and because their synergistic effects contribute to effective verification.
5. On-site Inspections (OSIs) will also contribute to transparency of future multilateral agreements, and they will provide early warning of possible non-compliance. OSIs can also “trigger” the need for other verification methods. They will be important in the area of non-proliferation because they can provide tangible evidence, observed by all parties to the inspections, of non-compliance.

