

PETER, laid down a course of proceedings which his successors have followed out with surprising exactitude; according to Captain WYAT the principles were—

1st. To create friendly relations with the United States who were then our most deadly enemies.

2nd. "To render England entirely dependent on her for the carrying out of her foreign policy and if possible ultimately to unite the two Royal Houses by matrimonial alliance.

3rd. Predominance of Prussia in Scandinavia for the purpose of employing that country against England and Russia, and also for the purpose of obtaining the command of the Baltic and thereby creating a fleet.

4th. His policy towards Russia was nearly identical with his policy toward England.

5th. To create friendly relations with Turkey for hostile purposes towards Russia and Austria, and in the end to obtain the possession of the entire Danube.

6th. To drive Austria from Germany, to weaken it by constantly intriguing with its different nationalities, and to attack the Austrian Empire whenever he could find an ally to share the plunder with him.

7th. France was the only ally on whose assistance FREDERICK believed he could always depend in a war for the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire.

8th. FREDERICK regarded the House of Savoy in the same light as he did France.

Such is an outline of the contents of this very valuable pamphlet; and its perusal should awaken serious considerations as to what the policy of the Whig Radicals is tending.

If it is to play into the hands of the Prussians it is evident what consequences must follow, but they have not yet succeeded in dismembering the Empire, and it is quite possible a revulsion of popular feeling may hurl them from the power they have abused to the infamy they merit, but in any case it is certain England will have before the close of the century to fight for her political existence as she did at its commencement.

In another column will be found an article from the *New York Nation*, under the title of "Line and Column," in which amidst a good deal of sound practical sense there are some absurdities.

That the day of close column manœuvres has long passed away is beyond doubt, their use during the late contest is only a proof of how slowly progress establishes itself in military ideas, that it has always been regarded as a delusion by British officers the tactical lessons of the experience of over a century can testify.

In the wars of continental Europe column opposed column, when Great Britain took a part therein the losses inflicted by the thin red line, if they did not lead to vic-

tory at least inspired a wholesome dread of that formation.

We cannot coincide in the idea that the day is past for line formations, because it is the most handy to advance and break off into skirmishing; order from, and the easiest as well as best to rally to, and because it can bring a greater weight of fire on any given point or object than any other formation; while even under artillery fire its losses will be as small as that of the skirmishers in advancing or retiring.

Neither do we believe in the position of the officer of the future that he must be better trained than the man of the present day, is beyond any doubt; but that he will be the sedate individual in spectacles, the book machine rather of the *Nation* seated on a camp stool in a sheltered position trusting to the honor and intelligence of his soldiers, is all *bosh*.

The old German title of Rittmeister—file leader—was both graphic and appropriate the commandant of a company or battalion always led it, and if our modern armies are to achieve victories, it will be by the officers leading as well as supervising their men.

War has not degenerated into a science of dialectics to be taught and practised by pedagogues in a school-room.

Our readers will remember the articles on *artillery*, which appeared in recent numbers of the *VOLUNTEER REVIEW*, and the reasons therein given for preferring the *breech loading* system both for field, garrison, and naval armaments.

As far as field artillery is concerned, the following extract gives the experiences of the Prussian service, as well as a description of the organization of its artillery.

We have never been favourably impressed with the vast superiority which has been claimed for the tactics, or strategy, or value of the Prussian system, as exemplified by the operations of the late Franco-Prussian war. Because it was throughout exceptional in all its characteristics, and the event was governed by incidents and causes never likely to occur again.

It is valuable, however, for the experience gained in the relative and comparative power of the weapons used, and the appliances of modern mechanical sciences to Logistics.

War, like any other applied art, will be modified by the conditions under which it is waged, but in the late case, the tactics of FREDERICK THE GREAT did not exhibit a true appreciation of the march of progress, and it was the utter breakdown of the French Intendence alone that prevented the cry of *Berlin* from becoming a reality:

"A Berlin military correspondent of the *London Standard*, reviewing the Prussian Manœuvres, says: "There are three kinds of field artillery in the Prussian Army, namely heavy or 6lb. batteries, light or 4lb. batteries, and horse, or 'riding artillery.'

Each battery in peace time is composed of 4 guns, and the waggons are only seen or used during the war. Even then they stick far less closely to the guns than is the case in our service. I am informed that in action the limber of a horse artillery gun carries 27 rounds, and that of a field battery gun 45, but I cannot vouch for these figures; suffice to say that the experience of the late war has led Prussian artillerymen to believe that waggons can be separated much further from the actual battery than is deemed advisable with us. Field batteries are formed in divisions or 'abtheilung,' there being four batteries in each division, while divisions of horse artillery only contains three batteries. All Prussian guns are breech loaders. The Prussians have got a new and most formidable weapon, the details of which are now kept secret. They also say that they have a most excellent time fuze, which they can fire with the most perfect safety from the breech loader. Apparently, however, except in the case of shrapnel shells, they much prefer the percussion fuze to the time fuze system. Quite apart, however, from length of range and accuracy of fire, they say that there is one argument in favor of the breech loaders which is all important on a campaign—namely, the saving of fatigue to the men who work it, and also the fact that a fewer number of men are required as gun detachments with the breech than with the muzzle loader. A Prussian field gun is manned by five men and a non-commissioned officer. Of these five, two sit on the axle tree seats, and three on the limber, while the non-commissioned officer rides. The gun is laid by the best shot of the detachment, whoever he may be, under the superintendence of the non-commissioned officer; if this marksman is killed or disabled, the next best shot takes his place. All gunners are trained to lay their guns, and are as thoroughly instructed in the principles of gunnery as the limited period of their service will permit. The Prussian artillery uses no range finder; they say that shots are themselves the best range finder. On a battery coming into action the officer in command judges a range, according to which the first gun is laid and fired; the effect of the shot is watched, the elevation of the second gun is proportionately changed, and so on until the true range is found, when the entire battery comes into action. Slow and steady firing is especially enjoined as the only principle on which successful practice can be obtained. Of course, during peace manœuvres the ammunition is limited, and shots are only fired to indicate the position which a battery has taken up. So much regarding the practical part of the business. It is needless to remark the value of the guns, and professional skill of the gunners can only be seen and tested by actual trial, which, fortunately for the parties engaged, is not made on living targets at peace manœuvres. Regarding however, external matters, one can speak with more authority and distinctness, and I can conscientiously say that the Prussian Artillery are far behind ours with respect to the appearance and smartness of their men, as regards the quality of their horses, and still more as regards their equipment. As regards smartness of opening fire and coming into action, and as regards quickness of movement, the German Artillery is certainly inferior to the English—the short term of service probably is not sufficient to enable them to turn out very practised gunners, while certainly the system of harnessing would render great rapidity of movement impossible."