

	Exports.	Imports.
Great Britain.....	\$14,262,504	\$34,260,509
North Am. Colonies.....	3,549,197	1,108,373
British West Indies.....	53,815	137,802
United States.....	25,583,800	20,272,907
France.....	266,987	1,174,884
Germany.....	29,344	383,401
Other For. Countries.....	624,572	1,711,151
Short Returns from Inland Ports.....	3,415,924	.....
Total, 1866-7 .....	\$48,486,143	\$59,048,987
Total, 1865-6 .....	56,328,380	53,802,319
Difference.....	7,842,237	5,246,668

The values of exports from the different ports were as follows:—Quebec, \$8,862,570; Montreal, \$8,104,622; and ports below Quebec, \$775,629. The exporting business done at the leading Inland ports was as follows: Clifton, \$4,120,520; Coaticook, \$3,519,400; Fort Erie, \$1,053,546; Hamilton, \$1,073,300; Port Hope, \$1,455,823; St. John's, \$2,033,552; Toronto, \$2,525,340. Importing has been carried on in the several leading ports in the following proportions, viz.: Montreal, \$28,139,283; Toronto, \$6,963,689; Clifton, \$5,658,889; Quebec, \$5,268,771; Hamilton, \$3,782,153; Kingston, \$1,611,217; and London, \$1,047,490.

Of the total imports, Montreal has nearly half; Montreal and Toronto two-fifths; Montreal, Toronto and Hamilton, two-thirds.

Turning to the excise department, it appears that brewing and distilling operations were carried on to the following extent:—

	1866.	1867.
Beer brewed, gals.....	5,954,922	6,925,380
Spirits distilled, gals..	3,925,753	2,912,434

Showing that for some reason the use of beer has to a large extent been substituted for that of spirits.

The quantity of grain consumed, and spirits and malt liquor produced in Toronto, were:—

Indian Corn, lbs. ....	11,041,200
Rye, lbs. ....	2,485,131
Wheat .....	
Oats .....	609,189
Mill Offal .....	49,745
Malt .....	709,135

Total for distillation .	14,894,400
Total for brewing.....	3,225,214
	<hr/> 18,119,614 <hr/>

Spirits produced, wine, gals.....	949,206
Malt Liquor " " " .....	1,038,249
<b>Total gals. ....</b>	<b>1,987,455</b>

Of Tobacco, Cigars, and Snuff, the following quantities were manufactured, about equal quantities in Upper and Lower Canada:—

	1866.	1867.
Tobacco, lbs. ....	3,092,773	4,660,450
Cigars, (No.).....	7,874,140	10,714,950
Snuff, lbs' .....	121,690	72,885

The quantities manufactured in Toronto  
was—

	1866.	1867.
Tobacco, lbs. ....	975,683	1,329,619
Cigars, (No.).....	1,753,075	3,223,400

The next annual statement will include the finances of the whole Dominion, and its interest will, no doubt, be greater, proportionate to the wider field it will embrace.

### Correspondence.

ETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

To the Editor of the Monetary Times.

SIR,—A series of articles have lately appeared in the *Montreal Daily News*, in which the *Ætna Life Insurance Company* of Hartford, Conn., is held up to public view as being anything but the kind of institution, in which persons anxious to make a future provision for their families, should invest.

I address myself to you on this subject, as being the Editor of the only Insurance Journal in the Dominion, and one who will be likely to watch with considerable interest the discussion that may arise on this question; also, one from whom the public will expect, an opinion, especially as you have alluded to it already. It is unnecessary to occupy much of your space in alluding to the failures of the monetary institutions in England and Scotland, (referred to in the first part of the article) which caused so much misery and destitution in those countries, and on account of which "gentle natures drivelled into lunacy," &c. I confess this is a sad picture, but unfortunately for its application, it refers to institutions that *have failed* in other countries, while he cannot point to a single instance of a *purely* Life Insurance Company, ever having failed in the United States. I wish to have this point distinctly understood, as it may be necessary to draw some inferences from it before this discussion is brought to a close.

The character of the attack may perhaps be best judged of by a reference to the source from which it emanates. The extraordinary success of the *Ætna* has aroused the determined opposition of rival companies, and as I have had repeated intimations that a movement of the kind was on foot, it has not taken me by surprise. The writer has quoted a passage from the Report of Mr. Barnes, Insurance Commissioner for the State of New York, by which he attempts to prove that the directors of the *Ætna* have applied 14 per cent of the premiums received on participating policies, in payment to stockholders, thereby defrauding the policyholders. In answer to this charge I give the passage in question, together with some facts brought out by the same Report.

"It will be noticed that the officers of the Aetna Life at Hartford, state that the stockholders receive one and one-half per cent upon participating premiums, the amount of which per centage is not stated in the item of dividends; paid during the year to stockholders, but is included without separation in the item of salaries paid to officers. This method of evading a frank statement of the amount of dividends paid to the stock during the year is evidence of unfairness of dealing in this respect, and that the officers feel that a public condemnation would follow from a full knowledge of the facts."

From the above it will be seen that Mr. Barnes *does not say* that the 14 per cent has been paid as dividends on stocks; but contents himself with insinuating that there are evidences of wrong doing on the part of the company, and concludes his remarks by saying (*mark the words*):—

"If the Aetna Life stockholders are receiving dividends out of the premiums amounting to fifty or seventy per cent annually on their paid up capital, this abstraction of funds should be discontinued, or the public confidence withdrawn from managers who sanction such patent injustice and outrage upon policy holders ignorant of the facts."

Will it be believed that after all this outcry about "abstraction of funds," "patent injustice" "outrage upon policy-holders," and "withdrawal of public confidence," it can be shown that the *Etna's* ratio of expenditure to income was considerably less than the average of New York Companies, as shown by the following table compiled from Mr. Barnes' own report:—

COMPANIES.	Number of Policies issued in 1896.	Ratio p. c. of expenses to total income.	Ratio of expenses to premiums only.	Ratio p. c. of amount paid for death claims.	Ratio p. c. of claims and expenses to total income.
Average of N. Y. Companies*....	3,080	18.19	20.62	14.18	32.38
Aetna .....	14,032	16.60	17.56	9.71	26.32
In favour of the Aetna .....	10,952	1.59	3.03	4.47	6.06

\*23 Companies.

showing that its new business was nearly five times the average. Its ratio of expenses to total income  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent below the average; its ratio of expense to premiums was over 3 per cent. less than the average; that its death claim to income was nearly  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. less than the average, and that summing all these items together its total expenditure to total income was over 6 per cent less than the average on New York Companies, and all this after the terrible  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent was abstracted. If anything more were needed to prove the utter groundlessness of the charge it is to be found in the fact that Mr. Barnes himself, on page 538 of his report, places the amount paid as dividends to stockholders, and the amount paid as salaries to "officers, trustees, directors, agents, clerks and other employees, (including the much it takes off  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent) as separate and distinct items.

I now come to the statement that "the Etna has not the means of paying a 50 per cent. annual dividend on its premiums received up to the 1st April last." The absurdity of this statement will become apparent when it is shown that more than one-third of the dividends on premiums up to the period in question, will not be due for four years, and the remaining two-thirds in one, two and three years from that date, and that the company will have received from these very policies, to say nothing of new business, several millions of dollars before that time arrives.

Should the premiums not be paid, the liability of the company to pay dividends ceases also, and we can only wonder how any man professing to know anything of the business of life insurance should have raised such an objection.

The *Etna* did pay a dividend of 50 per cent. on all premiums entitled to a dividend up to Dec. 31, 1867, and had a surplus after paying said dividend of \$999,978.81, just \$23.19 less than a million dollars, and has promptly met all claims against, including dividends up to the present time, and has now a surplus of nearly \$2,000,000.

The next charge is "that the Etna holds too large a proportion of its assets in the shape of premium notes, viz., over 60 per cent."

This statement is not only untrue in regard to the percentage of notes held, but exhibits gross ignorance (whether real or affected) on the part of the writer, regarding the note system as practised by the Etna.

Every premium note held by the Aetna is a lien on some policy within its surrender value, and to that extent, is equivalent to a mortgage, the funds for the redemption of which are in the hands of the Company. Suppose the premiums were all paid in cash, would any sane man question the propriety of loaning to the policy holder *any* amount within the office value of his policy, taking said policy as security? Now this is just the effect of the Aetna's note system, with this difference, that the interest is *invariably* exacted in advance, making the security just so much better for the Company. And