

years. The doubts and dissatisfactions are too deep to be dispelled quickly and coming events may very well intensify them." He pointed to claims by "editors, teachers, students, and citizens at large" that the Canadian government had too easily accepted "a United States defence policy which is characterized as being sterile at best and provocative at worst" (Document 304). Diefenbaker, despite his contempt for impractical "long-hairs talking in favour of there being no nuclear defences" (Document 110), shared Dewar's assessment of the public mood. The Prime Minister expressed his concerns over growing anti-American sentiment in Canada to Heenev, and these concerns were passed on to and discussed with high American officials (Documents 228-235).

As a result of these contradictory assessments, progress on an agreement concerning the storage of nuclear warheads at leased American bases in Canada was painfully slow. The text of notes authorizing the presence of warheads at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Bases was unofficially agreed on in July. But the draft agreement was not endorsed by Cabinet during 1960, despite Pearkes' emphatic assertion that it was "difficult to justify any further delay" (Document 254). Negotiations on nuclear weapons for Canadian forces proved even more tortuous. An ambiguous public statement by the Prime Minister on January 18 left American authorities unsatisfied and indeed "deeply disturbed" (Document 265) by the lack of clear direction in Canadian policy. In June, Pearkes pointed out to Diefenbaker that Canada was being placed in the "unhappy position" (Document 270) of paying for expensive BOMARC and Honest John missiles without any arrangement being put in place to arm them with the required nuclear warheads. It was left to Bryce to finally spur the government into action late in the year. He orchestrated the drafting of a document that allowed Cabinet to authorize negotiations based on the principle of joint control of American nuclear weapons assigned to Canadian units. In late December, Douglas Harkness (who had replaced Pearkes as Minister of National Defence in October) circulated the text of a draft agreement (Document 277). At the same time, however, Green prevailed over his pro-nuclear colleagues when he secured Cabinet's permission for Canada's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly to vote in favour of an Irish resolution against the spread of nuclear weapons (Document 111). Most of the other members of NATO abstained on this vote, but Green wished to give clear proof of Canada's commitment to the cause of disarmament. It was stipulated that if no progress was made on disarmament in the near future, Canada might then acquire nuclear weapons.

Other items on the continental defence and security agenda were also marked by slow progress. In June, Canadian ministers grudgingly approved the staging of a NORAD exercise, Operation Sky Shield. This replaced Operation Sky Hawk, scuttled by Ottawa the previous year. Negotiations began to acquire American interceptor aircraft to replace the ageing CF-100. This issue was fraught with political problems stemming from the Diefenbaker government's controversial cancellation of the Avro Arrow in 1959. The details of a possible agreement finally began to emerge in June, involving the reciprocal purchase of Canadian CL-44 transport planes by the