

that mood for the reason assigned, we come to the participles. The participial form of the verb was contrived to express its action or attribute, as exercised or exhibited in connexion with an individual, and agreeing with that individual in all its relations of gender, number, and case. It is obvious, therefore, that the action thus ascribed to the person in its adjectival form, should also, in its verbal and temporal character, express the time, whether past, present, or future, when it was predicable of the person, place, or thing. It is indispensable to a complete scheme of participles active, that there should be *three*, corresponding to the three great divisions of time as we find it to be in the Greek paradigm, present γράφω—aorist γράψας—and future γράψων. Yet in every Latin grammar I have seen, and every school I have examined, the boy is directed to say—participles active, present *Scribens*, writing; future *Scripturus*, about to write, without the slightest intimation that the participle of past time corresponding to γράψας is wanting. The opportunity is thus lost of noting this defect of the Latin verb, and the mode of remedying it, and at the same time of impressing the young mind with the discovery he had made of the triple division of tenses. A similar display of ignorance or oversight pervades all our grammars in the paradigm of the passive voice, where there is also a notable but unnoticed deficit in the participles. The boy is taught to say passive participles—preterite, *Scriptus*, written; future, *Scribendus*, about to be written; ignoring the absence of a present participle, while the example of the Greek stares them in the face in the three forms—γραφόμενος—γραφθείς—γραφθησόμενος, e.g., ἐπιστολή γραφομένη, a letter in the act of being written; γραφθεῖσα, a letter having been written; γραφθησόμενη, a letter about to be written.

It would not be difficult to extend these critical remarks on the want of philosophy in the construction of our grammars to other parts of speech, but I shall confine myself to one additional proof from the verb.

In the early days of my school life (about three score and ten years ago), I was compelled, as most of my contemporaries were, and many, I doubt not, still are, to commit to memory the following rhymes, intended to convey to the learner the theory and formation of the moods and tenses of the Latin verb:—

“From o are formed am and em,
From i ram, rim ro, sse, and ssem.
U, us, and rus are formed from um,
All other parts from re do come, (viz.)—
Bam, bo, rem, a, e, and i,
N, s, and dus, dum, do, and di.”

This doggerel, which is as unsound in theory as it is useless in practice, I should propose to supersede by some such process as the following; and let no teacher despair of being able to carry his pupils through the several steps with perfect intelligence, and with great benefit to their habits of reflection and ratiocination. I would invite them to fancy that state of things when man had a language to create, a state of things not unlikely to have existed after the confusion of tongues and the dispersion of our race recorded in the sacred volume, somewhat like the state described by Horace (Sat. I. 2, 100), when man was one of the *mutum et turpe pecus*, long engaged in mutual hostility till words were invented:—

“Donec verba quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenere.”

It would be easy to satisfy the learner that in this rude state, the first form the verb extorted from the wants and necessities of savage life would be that which commanded the services of others, rather than that which communicates information,—that is, would be the imperative rather than the indicative; and it would interest and delight the boy to find this supposition confirmed by the fact that the simplest and radical form of all Latin verbs is the second person of the imperative—Go, bring, lead, take, and a thousand others;
i fer duc cape

and that all the other moods and tenses are subsequently formed by additions to the imperative as the root. Yet I do not find that, in the endless discussions about stem and crude forms, this remarkable and leading fact in the history of language has ever been noticed, or, at least, taken advantage of in school grammars, or in the teaching of the Latin tongue.—“*The Museum*,” a new *English Quarterly*.

II. SPENCER'S ESSAYS ON EDUCATION.

We know of very few books that have any claim to the name of philosophical works on education. The theory of teaching is more or less treated in connection with suggestions of practice and of useful methods; but the whole tone of such works is empirical. The general statements and the particular methods are those suggested by individual experience and observation; and they have no such connection as to indicate that there lies in the mind of the writer

such an understanding of the nature of the human mind as it shows itself in children, and such a knowledge of things to be taught and of their relative value, and such appreciation of the method of teaching and governing, as he must have to whom education is a science and an art—a philosophy and a practice. Perhaps it is not yet time to expect a philosophy of education: the cycle of preliminary experiment is not yet exhausted; and until all schemes of error shall have been put to the test, we may not know how and what to choose.—Nevertheless, there are now talkers many, writers many, and actors many; and we may hope that, as the world is really learning some things in politics, in political economy, and in ethics, as well as in mathematics and natural science, it will not be long before fundamental principles can be stated in the philosophy of education. Whatever is offered as such philosophy in the present time is in fact only a contribution towards it—a contribution of material for the palace that is yet to rise.

The most important philosophical contribution that we have had in a long time is the little volume of essays by Mr. Herbert Spencer.* The four treatises composing the volume, though written for three different English Reviews, were written with a controlling unitary purpose, and hence form a well-composed book when put together. The first of the four we read with great interest when we read it in the *Westminster Review* (No. cxli), and expressed a wish that it could be read by every teacher, school-officer and parent in the land; a wish which the intervening period and our further reflections have not diminished in force. To us it is the most valuable of all the treatises, and the most philosophical. It raises the question “*What Knowledge is of the Most Worth?*” and proceeds to show what influences (of feelings, reason, and custom) usually determine men to choose a course of education, and what consideration should exercise a controlling influence. The first essay, and the second one, on *Intellectual Education*, we propose specially to notice at this time. We desire to introduce Mr. Spencer's volume to our readers by something more than the general terms of commendation which can be given in a brief book notice; and we hope that many a thoughtful teacher and parent may rejoice in communion with the thoughts of these essays.

Before Mr. Spencer attempts the solution or even the statement of the main question “*What knowledge is of most worthy?*” he notices the fact that this question is rarely raised; that as decoration among savages is more important than dress, so among civilized people the ornamental in education is more regarded than the useful; and that when a course of study is chosen, it is not selected for its utility, but under the influence of whim or custom. And the reason of this fact he finds in the other “*fact that, from the far past down even to the present, social needs have subordinated individual needs; and that the chief social need has been the control of individuals.*” We seek power over others; the means of impressing them; “*and it is this which determines the character of our education.*—Not what knowledge is of most real worth is the consideration; but what will bring most applause, honor, respect—what will most conduce to social position and influence—what will be most imposing. As through life, not what we are but what we shall be thought is the question, so in education, the question is not the intrinsic value of knowledge so much as its extrinsic effects on others.”

And even when the question of relative values of different knowledges is in some sort raised, no standard of value is recognized, and the whole question is bootless if mere caprice or fashion is to decide it at last. The oft-debated question respecting the superiority of classics or mathematics is insignificant in relation to the real question that should be proposed; and deciding it—if decision were possible—is no nearer approach to the answer of the great question which he proposes than choice between potatoes and bread is to a settlement of the whole theory of diet! A measure of relative value is, then, the first requisite in any controversy on the value of knowledge; and this measure is suggested in the following paragraph:

“How to live—that is the essential question for use. Not how to live in the mere material sense only, but in the widest sense. The general problem which comprehends every special problem is—the right ruling of conduct in all directions, under all circumstances. In what way to treat the body; in what way to treat the mind; in what way to manage our affairs; in what way to bring up a family; in what way to behave as a citizen; in what way to utilize all those sources of happiness which nature supplies—how to use all our faculties to the greatest advantage of ourselves and others—how to live completely. And this, being the great thing needful for us to learn, is, by consequence, the great thing which education has to teach. To prepare us for complete living is the function which education has to discharge; and the only rational mode of judging of any educational course is to judge in what degree it discharges such function. This test never used in its entirety, but rarely even partially used,

* Education, Intellectual, Moral and Physical. By Herbert Spencer, author of *Social Statistics*, *Principles of Psychology*, etc. D. Appleton & Co., New York, and Educational Depository, Toronto. (See page 125.)