

or sincerity or morality. We must, I know, pay the price for freedom, national and individual, by differing and disputing among ourselves on occasions. So we have congress versus parliament; dollar versus sterling; Commonwealth associations versus European federation; security by military strategy versus security through social and political strength; international obligations versus domestic responsibilities. Every democratic state has these conflicts within its borders, and every group of states has them between its members. We should be careful, however, to see that they are not permitted to weaken us unduly as we face the dangers ahead.

At some point in the encircling barrier of unsolved problems which hems us in at the moment, there may be some new opening upon which we could begin to work. With patience and with diligence we must search for this opening, and, when we find it, set about expanding it with every tool of diplomacy and negotiation that we have available. We shall not, I suggest, facilitate this search by permitting our hunger for peace to lead us into unrealistic and specious courses. On the other hand we shall only hinder it by bellicose declarations that all is perfect on our side, and anyway we can lick Joe Stalin!

I should like in the very few minutes that remain, to turn to what the Soviet Union is doing or is not doing in the particular field of atomic energy control.

During the past three or four months, while the United States has been going through the throes of its most difficult and fateful decision as to whether or not to push ahead with the development of the hydrogen bomb, because of the absence of agreement on the international control of atomic energy, the Russians have quietly and energetically been cultivating the impression, with some success, that they had already made new proposals for such agreement which we had turned down. Inferences are drawn from vague and speculative press reports that have passed the Moscow censors, as well as from some of Mr. Vishinsky's remarks on atomic energy in the last United Nations assembly, hinting that they have offered concessions which we are ignoring. Nothing could be more misleading or further from the truth. Nothing could be more dangerous than that this impression should spread.

Until last September our public were not particularly well informed as to what the Soviet position on atomic control actually was. Last autumn, therefore, when Mr. Vishinsky offered the assembly, as if it were something new, what he called strict inspection and effective control as an integral part of an atomic energy agreement, many people naturally thought that concessions were being made, and that at last the deadlock was being broken. Perhaps Mr. Vishinsky's intention was to concede and not to confuse, but some of his statements at that time seemed more like double talk, and in some cases were even mutually contradictory. In the course of the recent debate at Lake Success, he said everything about everything. If one makes a close and careful analysis of his statements as I have, it reveals nothing that could not be interpreted as being wholly consistent with the Soviet proposals of June, 1947, which did not provide anything approaching adequate international inspection and control.

If Mr. Vishinsky meant us to read something new and different into his words, I hope he will make that clear to us at the first opportunity. It is of the greatest importance that we should know. At the moment we certainly cannot find out at Lake Success. Hon. members will recall that the assembly last autumn directed the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, among other things, to discover what the new--if they were new--Soviet proposals