

defence spending and radical reductions in nuclear weapons rapidly vanished. Nuclear weapons were quickly re-rationalized in both the US and the Russian Federation and domestic opposition emerged in both countries to further cuts. The 1994 US Nuclear Posture Review brought in a policy of "lead and hedge" – i.e. to reduce to START II levels but to maintain a reserve nuclear force at START I levels for rapid reload in a crisis.⁵⁵ And, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1996, led the US to enunciate a policy threatening nuclear retaliation to deter not only nuclear, but also biological and chemical weapon attacks. For its part, the Russian Federation in 1999, revised its nuclear doctrine and citing a conventional force imbalance posited the early (even first) use of nuclear weapons to ensure its defence, and it allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in response to other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons.⁵⁶ And, Russia's new security concept of January 2000, stated that nuclear weapons were the only reliable means to dissuade NATO from using force against Russia.⁵⁷

Despite Washington's dire warnings about the threat of WMD use and terrorism, during the decade 1991-2001, a nascent consensus emerged on the meaning of strategic stability, at least as reflected in a succession of US-Russian joint statements. The two sides had agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. They had agreed to break the Cold War lockstep of matching nuclear weapon deployments and had agreed on frameworks for reducing by nearly one-half the deployed numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. Furthermore, they had initiated discussion on warhead transparency and dismantlement measures, possible measures on strategic offensive and defensive forces, and on a mix of possible measures on strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. In annual summits from 1993 through 2000, the US and Russia reached a number of significant agreements on strategic stability, disposition of excess weapons plutonium, demarcation of TMD testing limits, and the preservation of the ABM, among other measures.

In Vancouver, on April 4, 1993, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin declared their firm commitment to a dynamic and effective partnership that strengthened international stability, cooperation in preventing WMD and delivery systems proliferation, implementing the START agreements, and US assistance to Russia for dismantling its nuclear and chemical weapons.

A year and a half later in Moscow, on September 28, 1994, the two presidents issued a joint statement on strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security in which they agreed to ensure an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995, the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest possible date while continuing with their respective testing moratoria, to achieve a global ban on the production of weapon-usable fissile material, and to cooperate in enhancing the security of weapon-usable nuclear material and preventing nuclear smuggling.

At the fourth Clinton-Yeltsin summit, on May 9-10, 1995 in Moscow, the joint statement called for new opportunities to strengthen stability through openness and transparency. They welcomed the ongoing deactivation and dismantlement of strategic nuclear systems under START I and agreed to exchange information every three months on strategic systems that have been deactivated and eliminated. In an important new development, the presidents concurred that, once the START II Treaty

⁵⁵ Janne E. Nolan, "Preparing for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review," *Arms Control Today* (November 2000).

⁵⁶ See, Nikolai Sokov, "An Assessment of the Draft Russian Nuclear Doctrine," (October 1999), http://cns.miis.edu/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/ff_ruwea.htm.

⁵⁷ See, Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's New Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle," (28 January 2000), http://cns.miis.edu/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/ff_ruwea.htm.