

handling as well. Be that as it may, there are likely to be valuable lessons worth learning and these ideas may indeed be transferable. These are likely to be in areas relating to multilateral or third party activity and particularly to the role of the United Nations in its broadest dimension in facilitating rapprochement.

In order to achieve a lasting agreement, there must be an ability to ensure, in a non-discriminatory manner, that parties to an agreement are complying with it. This assurance must be satisfactory particularly for the signators and also for the international community at large. We are in the very early stages of tackling these problems. The activities relating to the United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) in the case of Iraq and of possible resolutions in the case of North Korea are at the cutting edge of a new phase of conflict resolution as the next decade approaches.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to provide a succinct review of the background and results to date of the IAEA and of UNSCOM relating to UNSCR 687(1991); to identify from the standpoint of future compliance some of the technologies and techniques employed as an on-going monitoring and verification capability is devised by the IAEA and by UNSCOM; and to discuss the possible transfer of this experience where applicable in the case of North Korea.

BACKGROUND AND RESULTS TO DATE

Security Council Resolutions

Between April and October 1991, the United Nations Security Council established the basic future compliance undertakings for all three parties in three specific resolutions (687, 707 and 715). Collectively, these three resolutions elaborate the scope of the monitoring and verification regime required to ensure that Iraq continues to meet its obligations. Selected provisions from these three resolutions are provided in Annex "A".

The first resolution, UNSCR 687(1991), adopted on 3 April 1991, outlined the cease-fire conditions that ended the Gulf War. Its key provisions required Iraq to declare and destroy all of its non-conventional (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. In effect, UNSCOM and the IAEA were mandated to finalize the job which the Coalition forces had begun in the Gulf War itself in dismantling Iraq's non-conventional military capabilities and infrastructure.